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In the new millennium, the Western aid effort towards Africa has surged due to writings by well-known
economists, a celebrity mass advocacy campaign, and decisions by Western leaders to make Africa
a major foreign policy priority. This survey contrasts the predominant "transformational" approach
(West saves Africa) to occasional swings to a "marginal" approach (West takes one small step at a
time to help individual Africans). Evaluation of "one step at a time" initiatives is generally easier than
that of transformational ones either through controlled experiments (although these have been much
oversold) or simple case studies where it is easier to attribute outcomes to actions. We see two themes
emerge from the literature survey: (1) escalation. As each successive Western transformational effort
has yielded disappointing results, the response has been to try an even more ambitious effort. (2) the
cycle of ideas.  Rather than a progressive testing and discarding of failed ideas, we see a cycle in aid
ideas in many areas in Africa, with ideas going out of fashion only to come back again later after some
lapse long enough to forget the previous disappointing experience.  Both escalation and cyclicality
of ideas are symptomatic of the lack of learning that seems to be characteristic of the "transformational"
approach. In contrast, the "marginal" approach has had some successes in improving the well-being
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I.  Africa’s Needs and Western response 
A.  Explosion of interest in “saving Africa” 
The last few years have seen unprecedented attention to an attempt by Western 
governments to rapidly develop Africa.
2 British Prime Minister Tony Blair called at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos in January 2005 for “a big, big push forward” in Africa to end 
poverty, financed by an increase in foreign aid.
3 Tony Blair commissioned a Report on Africa, 
which released its findings in March 2005, likewise calling for a “big push.” Gordon Brown and 
Tony Blair put the cause of ending poverty in Africa at the top of the agenda of the G-8 Summit 
in Gleneagles, Scotland in July 2005. In the 2005 summit at Gleneagles, Scotland, the G-8 agreed 
to double foreign aid to Africa, from $25 billion a year to $50 billion to finance the big push, as 
well as to forgive the African aid loans contracted during previous attempts at a “big push.” Two 
years later, Germany again made Africa an important item on the agenda of the G-8 summit it is 
hosted in Heiligendamm in June 2007. The G-8 again reiterated the promises made in 2005. 
Japan pledged to double its own aid to Africa in May 2008 over the next five years.
4  Most 
recently, the G8 Summit in Japan in July 2008 agreed: “We are firmly committed to working to 
fulfill our commitments on ODA made at Gleneagles, and reaffirmed at Heiligendamm, including 
increasing… ODA to Africa by US$ 25 billion a year by 2010.”
5
The goals of the Western effort are ambitious, not limited to promoting overall economic 
growth. A 2000 UN Summit agreed upon “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs) for the year 
2015 such as cutting poverty in half, reaching universal primary enrollment, sharply reducing 
mortality of infants and mothers, achieving gender equality, dramatically increasing access to 
                                                 
2 Following a very common convention, this paper means sub-Saharan Africa whenever it uses the name 
“Africa.”  
3 International Herald Tribune, Friday January 28, 2005, p. 1 
4 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/hukudaspeech/2008/05/28speech_e.html 
5 2008 G8 Summit Declaration, “Development and Africa,” July 8, 2008   3
clean water and other social indicators. Although this effort is worldwide, most of the MDG 
campaign focuses on Africa, where the shortfalls to the goals are the greatest.  
The G8 also is making efforts to address civil war and “failed states” (also known as 
“fragile” and “post-conflict” states) in Africa, saying at the 2008 summit: 
Peace and security are fundamental to states' ability to meet the needs of their people. Fragile and 
post-conflict states remain farthest from reaching the MDGs. Overcoming fragility and successful 
recovery requires comprehensive, integrated and sustained international assistance, including 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts where necessary, tailored to the particular context.
6   
 
  This campaign places an emphasis on rapid transformation as opposed to gradual 
progress. As the Africa aid advocacy group DATA lectured the G8 in its 2008 report: 
“Incrementalism will continue to help some people in Africa, but would be a disaster for most. … 
it certainly won't bring about the ultimate goal - help for Africa to 'build the successful future all 
of us want to see'. {quote from 2005 G8 Summit Communique}” (DATA 2008, p. 5) 
 
The previously obscure cause of African development has even burst into popular 
culture. Rock celebrity Bob Geldof assembled well-known bands for “Live 8” concerts on July 2, 
2005 in nine cities around the world to lobby the G-8 leaders to “Make Poverty History” in 
Africa. Even movie stars got involved, with Angelina Jolie touring Kenya with Jeffrey Sachs to 
make an MTV video in 2005. Vanity Fair devoted its July 2007 celebrity-laden issue to saving 
Africa, with feature articles such as “Madonna’s Malawi.” In what might qualify as a surrealistic 
moment, the Administrator of USAID asked a staffer to summarize the policy conclusions of the 
Vanity Fair analysis for U.S. foreign aid.
7 In the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 
2008, a diverse panel of celebrities ranging from Bono to Bill Gates to Queen Rania of Jordan 
called for “emergency” action to drastically reduce poverty in Africa by the year 2015. 
The debate on whether the West can “save Africa” revives a long-standing debate in 
development economics. One side of this view sees very rapid and comprehensive social change 
as possible, emanating from an elite of political leaders and outside experts who can start from a 
                                                 
6 2008 G8 Summit Declaration, “Development and Africa,” July 8, 2008 
7 I verified this by getting an actual copy of the memo.   4
blank slate in achieving development. The other side sees only gradual social change as possible 
(at least, gradual on average, since this side would concede there could be occasional rapid 
breakthroughs), emanating more from the emergent self-organizing order of many decentralized 
private entrepreneurs, creative inventers, and one-step-at-a-time political reformers, all 
constrained by existing traditions and social norms that have evolved for their own reasons over a 
long period. This debate has shown up in many forms over time, and with many different 
protagonists. In the 1950s, Albert Hirschman’s “unbalanced growth” was a partial version of the 
second view, in contrast to the first view: the “Big Push” arguments of Rosenstein-Rodan and 
Rostow that everything would need to change at once leading to “balanced growth.” P.T. Bauer in 
the 1960s was a forceful critic of the “Big Push” idea and argued that the payoff from outside aid 
was close to zero. In the 1980s, the advent of structural adjustment revived the debate about 
comprehensive versus partial reform. In the 1990s, the debate was about shock therapy vs. 
gradualism in the transition from Communism to capitalism. In the new millennium, the “Big 
Push” has regained favor in some aid policy circles, particularly with regard to Africa. This 
contrasts with the academic development literature, where there has been a turn away from such 
ambitious actions in favor of rigorously evaluating small interventions. Admittedly, this 
dichotomy is oversimplified and most scholars will fall somewhere in between the two extremes 
sketched out here. To give labels to the two extremes for the purposes of the Africa discussion, let 
us call the first approach “transformational” and the second approach “marginal.”
8  
Is this distinction artificial? Don’t both approaches recommend some of the same 
practical interventions? The litmus test I propose to distinguish the two approaches is in the 
ambition or goal of the approach. If an approach has the goal of achieving a large permanent gain 
in an aggregate indicator like growth or level of GDP per capita or a package of aggregate social 
                                                 
8 Although some may see this divide as corresponding to left vs. right, there are many trenchant critiques of 
the “transformational” view from the left, such as Scott (1998) and Ferguson (1994). Easterly 2006 pointed 
out that free market reforms under structural adjustment and shock therapy (usually associated with the 
right) were very much “transformational” attempts.   5
indicators, it will be called transformational. A program that aims at permanently raising the 
growth rate of the economy through a permanent increase in aid (often conditional on changes in 
aggregate policies or institutions) is clearly transformational by this test. If the approach has the 
goal of solving a much more specific problem for a target group of beneficiaries (much smaller 
than the entire population of a country), such as a program to administer deworming drugs to a 
specific group of schoolchildren, it is marginal by this test. The large goals of the 
transformational approach will inevitably lead to some differences in implementation, such as a 
greater emphasis on top down planning, as compared to decentralized provision by individual 
agents in the marginal approach. This makes clear why the two approaches are different even 
when they include the same interventions – after all, centrally planned economies and market 
economies also provided the same consumer goods, but this does not invalidate the distinction 
between the two. 
Of course, mainstream economics has always had much to contribute to this debate, first 
as the source of one of the most successful models of the “emergent self-organizing order”, the 
“invisible hand” of markets, with nobody in charge, and hence doesn’t automatically require an 
effort by leaders and experts at the top to transform the economy. This might suggest an 
inclination towards the marginal approach in economics.  However, economics has also 
contributed ideas such as general equilibrium, theory of the second best, multiple equilibria and 
poverty traps, and complementarities between policy interventions that might point towards a 
more comprehensive approach to avoid unintended consequences of a single partial equilibrium 
intervention. 
Although these debates touch on the fundamental determinants of development in Africa, 
their immediate preoccupation is with the question “what can ‘we’ do?” The ‘we’ seems to be 
development economists, aid agencies, G-8 politicians, and any other outsiders – so what can this 
“we” do to lift Africa’s poor out of poverty? Answering this question is sometimes confused with 
answering the much broader question “how can Africa develop?” However, there is no reason to   6
assume the two questions have the same answers.  This article will only be about the first 
question, and not about the second. 
We will see that both approaches to what outsiders can do have been studied in the 
academic literature on aid to Africa. The stronger the ambition of a transformational approach, 
the stronger the support it would seem to require from research findings, since the costs and 
consequences of success and failure are greater for large-scale programs than for small-scale 
ones. Unfortunately, the academic literature has stressed that the technology of research seems to 
go in the opposite direction – it is harder to test effects of transformational programs than 
marginal ones. The difficulties of testing the transformational approach are due to identification 
problems involving multiple endogenous variables and selection biases in aggregate data, 
uncertainty about what control variables should be included, the usual impossibility of natural 
experiments at the system level, and the difficulties of attribution of outcomes to interventions 
with a program that involves multiple interventions. Not only that, but the quality of 
macroeconomic data is poor in developing countries (even more so in Africa), with well known 
discrepancies between macro data and household data on aggregate trends in income and poverty, 
and startlingly large revisions to macro data on these same indicators. The aid to Africa literature 
also suffers from theoretical shortcomings, as standard neoclassical and political economy theory 
– such as the central role of incentives for private individuals and public officials – often seems 
neglected in favor of mechanical models without firm theoretical basis or bold assertions about 
what the ideal policymaker could achieve. Of course, there are some macroeconomic studies that 
do better than others dealing with these problems. The bulk of such results, along with simple 
evidence comparing outcomes to intuitive notions of counterfactuals, suggest serious doubts that 
there have been positive results from transformational programs in Africa. 
In contrast to identification problems in the aggregate literature, the boom in the 
academic literature in randomized evaluation (RE) of particular interventions is motivated by the 
claim that the problems with aggregate econometrics can be resolved using micro data (also   7
directly collected by researchers and thus of higher quality than macro data) in a randomized 
framework. The randomization literature makes a claim to have solved the identification problem 
at least for the specific intervention at the place and time being evaluated.  Critics of RE have 
questioned whether the results can be extrapolated to more general aid policy settings, and RE 
should not be viewed as the only or even the principal methodology available under the marginal 
approach. Hence, the marginal approach in this paper should not be equated to the RE approach. 
However, RE does at the very least signify a remarkable shift by academic development 
economics towards marginal ambitions away from transformational ambitions. Take one step at a 
time and make sure it is a positive step – this seems to be the agenda of the new literature. I 
believe this shift in focus and ambition, which may have been an accidental consequence of the 
commitment to the RE methodology, is actually a greater contribution to the development 
literature than the methodological one (for reasons to be discussed below). 
This shift in ambition is not much reflected in aid policy discussions (as the quotes above 
verify), and the gap between aid practitioners and the academic development economists may 
now be even wider than it was in the past. There are some small signs of this gap closing, such as 
the recently adopted Development Impact Evaluation (DIME) program at the World Bank, but it 
is unlikely to disappear. The World Bank’s motto is “Our dream is a world free of poverty.” This 
motto is probably much more likely to attract political support and funding than a slogan like “our 
dream is a world full of rigorous evaluations of small development interventions.” Yet academics 
have to be honest about what we can know, regardless of political consequences. One of the 
major proponents of RE (Banerjee 2008) makes a (perhaps unusually strong) statement that 
shows the gulf between the transformational views of the aid agencies and the marginal views of 
the academics in the RE literature (whose doubts about knowing how to raise growth are shared 
by many macro economists, as we will see below): 
It is not clear to us that the best way to get growth is to do growth policy of any form. Perhaps 
making growth happen is ultimately beyond our control. Maybe all that happens is that something 
goes right for once (privatized agriculture raises incomes in rural China) and then that sparks   8
growth somewhere else in economy, and so on. Perhaps, we will never learn where it will start or 
what will make it continue. The best we can do in that world is to hold the fort till that initial 
spark arrives: make sure that there is not too much human misery, maintain the social 
equilibrium, try to make sure that there is enough human capital around to take advantage of the 
spark when it arrives.  
 
Even if randomized experiments do not resolve all the issues (see below), or if they are 
not performed or even feasible, it is still easier to have some notion of the effectiveness of 
marginal programs. Indicators of inputs and outcomes are usually easier to measure, plus 
attribution of outcomes to inputs is usually more intuitive, so that even raw data on outcomes, 
along with case studies can give some partial verdict on marginal approaches. Another advantage 
of a marginal program is that if it doesn’t work, then it is more obvious which specific 
intervention failed. In contrast, even when there is an indication of failure of a transformational 
approach, there is little guidance about how to adjust it to work better – there are too many things 
changing at once to know what caused the failure.    
Hence, another consequence of the differential ease of testing for positive effects of 
marginal approaches compared to transformational approaches is that there is more possibility of 
learning from the former. We will see that, perhaps because the transformational approach has 
been dominant, aid ideas have often been cyclical, with the same ideas going out of fashion only 
to come back again many years later – a pattern that is suggestive of lack of learning. We will see 
other examples that show little or no learning over time. 
Another suggestive symptom of lack of learning has been escalation. When one long list 
of transformational actions does not achieve satisfactory results, new (untested) actions are added 
– as opposed to deciding which of the first set of actions contributed to success or failure (very 
hard to do in the transformational approach). So aid to Africa has escalated over time from 
individual projects to structural adjustment to institutional transformation to ending civil wars and 
reconstructing failed states.  
B.  Poor growth and income levels   9
Why are calls to “save Africa” more common than calls to “save Latin America” or” save 
Asia”? The most obvious explanation is that Africa has a particularly unhappy combination of a 
low level of income and other social indicators, and low rate of progress on these indicators.
9  
First and foremost, Africa commands attention because it is the poorest region and has 
the worst per capita growth rates (which are obviously related facts if we measure poverty at the 
end of the period). As of 2005, 50.4 percent of Africa’s population (380 million) live below the 
World Bank’s international extreme poverty line ---$1.25 a day in PPP terms -- this proportion is 
about the same as it was in 1981. The mean consumption of this group was $0.73 a day (Chen 
and Ravallion 2008). 
Figure 1 shows an index on a  log base 2 scale of an index of per capita income in the 
median African and non-African nation from 1950 to 2006, with the index=1.0 in 1950 (and thus 
log (index)=0 in 1950). The median country in Africa had positive growth 1950-1970, but was 
already falling behind the non-Africa median developing country as early as 1960.
10 Divergence 
accelerated after 1970, when the median African country’s growth was actually negative until the 
mid-1990s. There has been some recovery since, but the 2006 level in the median African country 
is barely above the previous peak in 1973. 
                                                 
9 I do not have space to discuss the important issue of data quality, which is generally very poor for many 
of the indicators to be considered in this paper. Failure to invest more in data collection is one of the less 
noticed failures of the Western aid effort. For the purposes of description and analysis in this paper, I can 
only hope that the signal outweighs the noise, and I resort frequently to averages and medians to remove 
some of the noise.  
10 Some might argue for a population-weighted index of African performance, which would give heavy 
weight to Nigeria and South Africa. If we take the West’s effort to save Africa as operating at the level of 
national governments (which is certainly how it was conceived), then the median country outcome seems 
like the right metric to discuss the outcome of Western efforts.   10
Figure 1: Index of per capita income in Africa and other developing 
nations































































C.  Poor social indicators  
Life expectancy is another indicator that highlights Africa’s tragedy, thanks to the double 
blow of high infant mortality and high adult mortality from AIDS. It is possible to pick a 
threshold for life expectancy (58 years) in which every African country is below that threshold 
and only a handful of societies elsewhere are (see Figure 2).   11
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Table 1 highlights a fuller set of indicators on which Africa does very poorly in international 
comparisons. It dramatizes this by showing for every indicator in which there are N African 
observations, what percent of the N worst places in the world according to this indicator are 
occupied by African nations. For these indicators, Africa makes up 25-35 percent of the 
worldwide sample, but occupies 70-80 percent of the worst rankings in the sample. Africa does 
very badly not only on per capita income, growth, and life expectancy, as already mentioned, but 
also on related social indicators such as infant mortality, AIDS prevalence, malnutrition, literacy, 
and the overall Human Development Index of the UN (which is a composite of the other 
indicators in this table). Deaton (2008) shows that life satisfaction (as measured by the Gallup 
World Poll) is strongly correlated with per capita income, so these measures suggest well-being 
in some broad sense is indeed significantly worse in Africa than elsewhere. (Deaton suggests the 
average Togolese man would be hospitalized for depression if he lived in Denmark).  12
 
Table 1: Ranking of African countries by key international indicators where Africa does 





















Income per capita  130 44 35 34% 80%
Percent of 
Population Living 
on less than a $1 a 
day  99 28 23 28% 82%
Per capita growth 
1960-2003  113 44 34 39% 77%
Life expectancy  187 48 42 26% 88%
Infant mortality  195 48 36 25% 75%
Percent of 
Population 15-49 
that is HIV 
positive 149 38 32 26% 84%
Prevalence of 
malnutrition, 2003  148 44 31 30% 70%
Literacy  122 34 21 28% 62%
Human 
Development 
Index  177 44 36 25% 82%
 
D.  Not overdoing negative stereotypes 
Although there is plenty of bad news on Africa, it is important to steer clear of 
stereotypical extremes. Some of those who want to save Africa justify their mission by painting a 
picture of Africa that is even grimmer than the not-so-happy reality. For example Collier (2007, 
p.3) portrays African societies that “coexist with the twenty-first century, but their reality is the 
fourteenth century: civil war, plague, ignorance” (perhaps this statement is meant to be hyperbole 
in a book for general audiences). Celebrity activist Bob Geldof paints a similar picture: "War, 
Famine, Plague & Death are the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse and these days they're riding 
hard through the back roads of Africa." The popular stereotype of Africans (reinforced by   13
statements like these) seems to be as starving AIDS-stricken refugees being slaughtered by child 
soldiers, an image reinforced by the Western media following the “if it bleeds, it leads” rule of 
journalism. The reality of Africa contradicts the extremely negative stereotypes. While many of 
these disasters may be more likely in Africa than elsewhere, they are inherently rare occurrences. 
Table 2 shows that the Four Horsemen are the experience of a small minority of Africans – still 
far too many, but less than what seems to be implied by the stereotypes. 





Average annual war deaths as proportion 
of population, 1965-2005  0.0001
Proportion of male children ages 10-17 
who were child soldiers in 1999  0.0019
Average annual proportion affected by 
famine, 1990-2005  0.0029
Proportion of population who are refugees 
or internally displaced persons, 2005  0.0053
Proportion of population who died from 
AIDS in 2007 
    0.0020 
 
Although Africa is often portrayed as a place of uniquely bad government and civil war, 
its performance on quantitative measures of governance and war indicators is not as bad as that 
shown in Table 1. Using the same methodology as Table 1, African countries occupy 39 percent 
of the N worst places on democracy, 45 percent on corruption, and 35 percent on time spent in 
civil war since independence, as compared to Africa’s 24-27 percent of the cross-country sample. 
The world’s poorest region is still over-represented on these indicators, but to a much lesser 
extent than on the income, poverty, and social indicators shown above. (The average across 
countries for time spent in a serious civil war in Africa is 8.5 percent of the time since 
independence, which suggests war in Africa is a little more widespread than the fatality statistics 
in Table 2 might imply, but not much more so than in other very poor nations.) There are plenty   14
of non-African countries sharing the bottom ranks for democracy, corruption, and war, 
highlighting again the need for a balanced rather than stereotypical view of Africa.
11
There is an incentive for aid agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
exaggerate Africa’s negatives to facilitate fund-raising, even if most aid officials are professional 
enough to resist the temptation. Aid veteran Alex de Waal (1997) gives some (probably extreme) 
examples. He notes how some aid NGOs during the Christmas fund-raising season react to any 
current crisis such as a famine, drought, war, etc. with a “habitual inflation of estimates of 
expected deaths. ‘One million dead by Christmas’ … has been heard every year since 1968 and 
has never been remotely close to the truth.” (de Waal 1997, p. 144)
12  Journalists also sometimes 
adopt advocacy roles in disasters. De Waal (1997, p. 184) quotes a Somali doctor who describes a 
conversation he had with a television photojournalist in Somalia in 1992: 
He just said to me, “Pick the children who are most severely malnourished.” I asked, “You go 
into a feeding centre with a thousand children. Two hundred are bad…why do you just select the 
two hundred –or the smaller number who are severely malnourished?” [The journalist] replied, “I 
am doing this to raise funds.” 
 
E.  Aid to Africa 
i.  Trends in aid to Africa 
The recent high profile of Africa in international policy discussions is matched by a surge in aid 
to Africa (figure 3). The surge in aid came on top of a high base, so the cumulative total of aid to 




                                                 
11 There are numerous other examples of exaggeration of Africa’s negatives in the aid policy discussion. 
Suhrke and Samset 2007 document how the likelihood of African civil wars starting up again after ending 
was overstated by a factor of two even in academic journals. Easterly 2008 shows how the choice of 
indicators in the Millennium Development Goals exercise consistently made Africa look worse than other 
equally plausible indicators.  
12 De Waal’s (1997) list includes Biafra 1968, the Sahel 1973, Cambodia 1979, Ethiopia 1984, Sudan 1985, 
Ethiopia 1987, Sudan 1990 (and many years since), Somalia 1992, Rwandese refugees 1994, and eastern 








Figure 3: Aid to Africa 



































ii.  Aid compared to other regions 
  Some of those who advocate further aid increases to Africa point out that aid to Africa is 
not that large measured in per capita recipient terms.  However, this is misleading because there is 
a pronounced small country bias in aid. African nations with large populations get little aid as 
percent of GDP (notably Nigeria and South Africa), while many small African nations have large   16
ratios of aid to national income. Hence, even prior to the recent surge in aid, the median African 
nation was already far more aid dependent than the median non-African developing nation (figure 





Figure 4: Aid to Africa in international perspective 
 





































































II.  Theories and Evidence of the Effect of Western Assistance on Africa 
What would economic theory predict about the success of Western efforts to transform 
Africa? The models most often cited by those who predict large effects of Western efforts on 
Africa are models of poverty traps and multiple equilibria in which Africa’s adverse initial   17
conditions are both the explanation for African poverty and the potential lever by which Africa 
can be transformed, by making direct monetary transfers or by directly improving an input into 
development outcomes.  
The alternative view is that of a unique equilibrium determined by adverse fundamentals. The 
latter view would require Western efforts to directly seek to improve the fundamentals, with a 
more modest payoff. Hence the “poverty trap” model goes with the “transformational” 
perspective, while the “fundamentals” approach goes with the “marginal” perspective..  
A.  The Attempt to Boost African Growth with Foreign Aid 
The simplest way that the “West could save Africa” would be if an injection of Western money 
(foreign aid) raised growth. Traditional development models of the 1950s and 1960s, which have 
now come back in favor in some policy circles, say that Africa is in a “poverty trap”, in which a 
Big Push of aid to raise available funds for investment would permanently raise African growth 
(it is clear why this model is on the “transformational” side of the social change debate).  
a.  Theoretical model of poverty traps 
A possible hypothesis of why Africa is poor is that it is in some version of a “poverty trap,” 
which depends purely on initial conditions. The competing explanation is that Africa’s poverty is 
determined by fundamentals, regardless of initial conditions.  To give a very general notion of a 
poverty trap, suppose there is some determinant X of per capita income y (we will call it “Factor 
X”), which is itself a function of per capita income y. The shapes of the two relationships, 
y=f(Factor X) and Factor X=g(y), will determine if poverty traps occur. Among the many 
possible candidates (not mutually exclusive) for Factor X in the aid and poverty trap literature, 
many of which will be considered below, are saving and investment, infrastructure, agricultural 
technology, education, health, policies, institutions, violent conflict, military coups, natural 
resource dependence, and “failed states”.
13 The poverty trap view would hold if the situation 
depicted in Figure 5 holds. If the slopes are as in Figure 6, then a “fundamentals” explanation for 
                                                 
13 See Sachs (2005) and Collier (2007).    18
Africa’s poverty holds. In the first view, all countries have the same functional relationships, and 
only worse initial conditions have trapped Africa at the low equilibrium. In the fundamentals 
view, Africa has less of Factor X for every level of income, and it is this that determines its lower 
income. 
  As is obvious and already well known, although sometimes not always understood in aid 
policy circles, the simultaneity of factor X and income is not sufficient to generate “vicious 
circles” in which income and factor X get into a downward spiral on their way to the poverty trap. 
What is required is that BOTH Factor X and income have to be sufficiently sensitive to each 
other to generate the slopes shown in figure 5. For example, if log y=a+b log X and log X = c + d 
log y, then a poverty trap will be generated if bd>1. In other words, if the multiplicative average 
of elasticities of y wrt X and X wrt y is greater than 1, then there will be “vicious circles” and 
“poverty traps.” Another simple prediction of the poverty trap model is that ∆log y (i.e. the per 
capita growth rate) is increasing in the level of the initial log y (log per capita income).  
  What is so critical about the difference between the two figures, and what makes the 
poverty trap model so appealing, is that either Factor X or income just needs to have a one-time 
increase to escape the poverty trap. One only needs to increase one of the two, because Factor X 
would endogenously increase in response to higher income, and income would increase with 
Factor X. The escape from poverty through a one-time income increase makes for an appealing 
aid advocacy story -- the need for aid is temporary, after which growth becomes self-sustaining. 
In the fundamentals view, in contrast, an exogenous, temporary increase in income through aid 
would have no effect. A temporary increase in Factor X would also be unavailing. Moving Africa 
to a higher level of income would require some kind of direct intervention that would 
permanently shift Factor X up for every level of income. 
  Hence, the “poverty trap” depicted in Figure 5 makes the solution to Africa’s poverty just 
one-shot cash transfers to whoever is the agent short of money to pay for X (the government for 
public goods, and private citizens for private goods and for saving/investment). Alternatively,   19
outsiders could pay for directly or implement a technological fix to raise X, and this would get the 
economy out of the poverty trap. The difference from the fundamentals approach to Factor X is 
that the increase in X need only be a one-time temporary increase in the poverty trap story, and 
the effects of an increase in X are much larger in the poverty trap story (transforming the country 
from poor to rich) than in the fundamentals story (a marginal increase in income).     
However, if some types of income increase Factor X, but aid receipts do not, then aid 
would not work to escape the poverty trap even if it exists. For example, if X is institutions, we 
will see below that some studies argue that aid makes institutions worse (because aid increases 
the payoff to corruption, for example), even though we usually believe that higher income makes 
institutions better. Again, some poverty trap stories based on aid overlook the incentives faced by 
those who receive the aid when postulating that aid will have a positive effect on some particular 
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The first and historically most oft cited mechanism for a poverty trap is that saving is very 
low for people who are very close to subsistence (as would be predicted by an intertemporal 
version of the Stone-Geary utility function). In a closed economy, saving is equal to investment, 
so investment is also low. In the Harrod-Domar model with the capital constraint binding, growth 
of GDP per capita is simply a linear function of the investment (=saving) rate minus the 
population growth rate and minus the depreciation rate. If saving is too low to keep up with 
population growth and the depreciation of capital, then per capita growth will be zero or negative. 
Early development economists in the 1950s and 1960s postulated a desirable per capita growth 
rate and calculated the “investment requirement” to meet this target – the distance between the 
low domestic saving rate and the “investment requirement” was called the “Financing Gap”. The 
role of aid was to fill the Financing Gap (Rostow 1960 and the “Two Gap Model” of Chenery and   22
Strout 1966). Thus, this model predicted a strong growth effect for foreign aid through its role in 
boosting domestic investment above what domestic saving would finance. 
Although this model soon went out of favor in the academic literature on development (see 
Easterly 1999a for a discussion), it has come back strongly in the last few years in policy 
discussions, international organizations (where it always remained alive to some extent), and 
books for popular audiences. Current policy advocates for an increase in foreign aid to Africa 
have cited this model explicitly (Devarajan et al. 2002 at the World Bank, Blair Commission on 
Africa 2005, Sachs 2005, 2008, Collier 2007). One attraction of this model is that it allows a 
mechanical calculation of “aid requirements” to achieve growth targets for Africa. 
The “Financing Gap” approach shows the lack of attention to incentives (particularly local 
incentives) that has plagued the aid literature. Even in a closed economy, saving depends not only 
on the distance from subsistence but also on the local incentive to save depending on the rate of 
return to saving and investment. In an open economy, investment is not determined by domestic 
saving, but depends on the rate of return to investment.  Private foreign investors and bank 
lenders will invest in the economy if returns are attractive enough.
14  Domestic investors will also 
compare the returns to domestic and foreign investments, as shown by Africa’s extensive capital 
flight in which an estimated 39 percent of the stock of Africans’ capital is held outside the 
continent (Collier, Hoeffler, and Patillo 2001).  
In the Solow model of a closed economy, a strong relationship between income and saving 
rates could generate multiple equilibria at low and high levels of capital stock, reopening the 
possibility of a poverty trap. Kraay and Raddatz 2005 have shown that the relationship between 
initial capital and saving must follow an S-shaped curve to generate a poverty trap.  
                                                 
14 The development economists of the 50s and 60s can be excused for neglecting this 
possibility given the underdeveloped international capital market of that era. There is much 
less excuse today, when many African countries have had some access to international capital 
markets beginning in the 1980s, and when those who today continue to lack access probably 
do more because of the investment risk than any market imperfection.   
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The other main mechanism to generate a poverty trap is some kind of nonconvexity in the 
production function in the Solow model. There may be strong external economies to investment, 
or there may be high fixed costs to investment projects such that a minimum threshold must be 
passed for investment to be productive (“you can’t build half a bridge”). This idea was part of the 
inspiration for the original article that first proposed a Big Push (Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in 1943). 
This strand has had a longer shelf-life in the academic literature than the “Financing Gap” model 
because of the great interest of theorists in models with multiple equilibria (see for example the 
article by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989). 
b.  Empirical evidence on poverty traps 
i.  General sample 
It is not that easy to test for poverty traps in general, because they can take so many different 
forms and apply at so many different levels of aggregation. It is plausible that there WAS a 
poverty trap at the global level in the very long run (Galor 2005, Galor and Weil 2000), which 
may have inspired the idea of poverty traps in development. 
It is somewhat easier to test some of the specific poverty trap mechanisms specified by early 
and recent development models. The savings- poverty trap model is testable by examining the 
shape of the savings function. Kraay and Raddatz 2007 failed to find evidence for the necessary 
S-shaped behavior of saving (they also failed to find technological nonconvexities in the 
production function, for good measure).  
A more general test of the poverty trap depicted in Figure 5 is simply checking whether 
initially poor countries are more likely to have zero or lower growth than richer ones. The issue of 
growth differentials between rich and poor countries is the subject of a gigantic literature on 
convergence, the usual finding of which is that poor countries grow faster conditional on other 
fundamentals (“conditional convergence”). However, this is not the right test if the fundamentals 
are the factor X’s which may be responding to income in a way that creates a poverty trap. A 
simpler test is whether poor countries unconditionally grow more slowly or are more likely to   24
have zero per capita growth (recall the prediction of the poverty trap model that growth is 
increasing in initial income). Easterly 2006 failed to find evidence of this type for poverty traps at 
low initial income – the poorest quintile at the beginning of each period did not subsequently 
have significantly lower growth rates than higher income strata. 
ii.  Africa-specific poverty trap 
Some of the literature argues that Africa is caught in a poverty trap even if other regions are not, 
or more generally, that countries in the “Bottom Billion” are still in a poverty trap which other 
initially poor countries have managed to escape. This latter story is close to making the poverty 
trap hypothesis non-falsifiable and tautological, in which any country still poor is in a poverty 
trap and any initially poor country that has grown richer is not. Collier 2007 shows that the 
Bottom Billion have had poor growth, but this finding suffers from selection bias. The Bottom 
Billion poorest countries were selected at the END of the period, thus biasing the sample towards 
countries that have had dismal growth performance over the preceding period. 
An Africa-specific poverty trap seems to be ex-ante testable – the shapes of the Factor X 
and y curves could be different in Africa than elsewhere.  For example, Africa’s disease 
environment could be worse than other regions, and the health poverty trap could hold if African 
health is more sensitive to income than in other regions.  However, if Africa’s poor economic 
growth is the motive for singling out Africa for testing for a region-specific poverty trap, then a 
selection bias still renders the Africa-specific poverty trap test invalid. It is suggestive, moreover, 
that a number of African members of the “Bottom Billion” were middle-income countries in 
earlier periods and then declined into the bottom (Cote d’Ivoire being the classic example: the 
“Ivorian miracle” of 1960-78 turned into one of the worst growth rates ever for the subsequent 
quarter-century.) 
Of course, casual observation also influences priors about the Big Push and the Africa 
poverty trap stories. If the Big Push was already tried in Africa (as might be suggested by the 
aid/GNI numbers above), aid has further increased rather than being temporary, and yet Africa   25
remains in poverty, then that seems inconsistent with the simplest stories of the Big Push and the 
poverty trap. 
c.  Empirical evidence on aid and growth 
The literature has attempted more formal testing of the prediction of the poverty trap model that 
aid will have a sizeable effect on economic growth, as it enables countries to break out of poverty 
and move towards higher income (the “transformational” view again).  
i.  Most widely cited results 
The aid and growth prediction has been the subject of a vast empirical literature. The 
literature only really became meaningful when the severe problem of reverse causality was 
addressed with the use of instrumental variables measuring political motivations for aid flows, as 
well as population size (a promising instrument, since as already noted, there is an exogenous 
small-country bias in aid such that smaller countries get higher aid per capita and higher aid as a 
ratio to their income). Boone 1996 was among the first to use such instruments and found zero 
effects of aid on investment and growth.  
Boone provoked further testing of the claim that aid raised growth. By far the most cited aid 
and growth study in the entire literature was Burnside and Dollar 2000 in the American Economic 
Review (BD).
15 BD also found that aid had no effect on growth. However, they also tested an 
interaction term between aid and government policy, which was significantly positive in some of 
their regressions. Hence, they concluded that raised growth when the recipient had good policies 
(measured by the Sachs-Warner openness index, low inflation, and low budget deficits). This 
finding offered an irresistible blend of plausibility and policy advice – reallocate aid to countries 
with good policies. Hence, it has been very influential in the policy debate about aid, and even 
contributed to the creation of a new US government aid agency (the Millennium Challenge 
Corporation) designed to give aid to countries with good policies.  
                                                 
15 A search on Google Scholar for key words “aid” and “growth” gave 1384 cites for BD. Another paper by 
Collier and Dollar 2004 had essentially the same finding “aid works when policies are good” and had 509 
cites. The sum of these two (1893) is about four times more than any other set of aid and growth results.    26
What is notable given this strong policy influence is that the original results were both 
weak and fragile. BD used similar instruments as Boone for aid. Curiously, however, the 
significant positive effect of aid on growth (with “good policies”) held only in their OLS 
regressions, not in 2SLS (they argued this was not a problem because they failed to reject 
exogeneity of aid). And even for the OLS coefficients, the positive growth effect of aid was 
significant (under good policies) in just 2 out of the 4 regressions they presented. Even this was 
after they excluded some outliers that went against the hypothesis (as they made transparent). 
Furthermore, Easterly, Levine, and Roodman 2003 (ELR) subsequently showed that the 
significance of the Burnside-Dollar aid-policy interaction term even in the OLS regressions where 
it was significant was not robust to some basic checks, such as adding new data that had become 
available since the original study.
16 The distinguished academic panel led by Angus Deaton that 
reviewed World Bank research singled out the Burnside and Dollar results for criticism for lack 
of robustness and unconvincing identification strategy, and criticized the World Bank for 
overselling this particular result in its advocacy for more foreign aid (Deaton et al. (2006), pp. 52-
57). 
ii.  Identification, Data mining, Robustness checks, and Magnitudes 
This survey does not make more of an effort to survey all corners of this gigantic literature on 
aid and growth because the quality of most articles is poor. Most aid and growth articles fail to 
have a serious identification strategy.  
While it was certainly progress to address identification in the articles cited above, that is not 
to say identification is easy to achieve. For example, does politically-motivated aid (such as aid to 
Egypt) have the same effects as altruistic aid? If not, the use of political motivations as 
instruments will address the effect of the first, but not the second.  
                                                 
16 This set of results was the second most cited in the Google Scholar search on “aid” and “growth.” In 
various forms it was cited 474 times as of August 2008.    27
Population size is another promising candidate for an instrument because of the exogenous 
and pronounced small country bias in aid. Of course, it may not satisfy the exclusion restriction as 
population size might directly affect growth. The growth regression literature has extensively 
looked for population scale effects and has generally failed to find them.
17 This is not a valid test 
of the exclusion restriction, but it does give some important reduced form information.  Given 
that aid received as a ratio to income is strongly affected by population size, then if aid affected 
growth, we would expect smaller population size would be associated with higher growth. This is 
not there in the data, which partly reflects the poor growth performance of many small Pacific 
and Caribbean islands and small African nations (all on average also very aid-intensive), so this is 
indirect evidence against a positive growth effect of aid.
18  
Werker et al 2008 is a recent paper that seems to have a believable and original identification 
strategy (aid from OPEC members to their poor Muslim allies, with the instrument being the price 
of oil interacted with a Muslim dummy). They also find a zero effect of aid on medium-term 
growth. There is still the doubt about this is whether it extrapolates to non-intra-Muslim aid. 
There is no clear theory as to what other control variables should be included, which 
also weakens confidence in knowing what instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction. There 
is even doubt how the aid variable itself should be included (variants in the literature have 
included quadratic terms for aid/GDP, the log of aid, separating out aid loan repayments as a 
linear term combined with a log aid term, interacting aid with other variables, and many 
others), there is a serious data mining problem. Control variables in the literature have 
included such non-intuitive entries as Ethnic Fractionalization* Assassinations (BD). This is 
on top of the general data mining problem in growth regressions, in which Durlauf, Johnson, 
and Temple 2005 showed that 145 separate variables had been found to be significant in 
                                                 
17 Easterly and Kraay (2000) found no evidence that small population size affected growth performance on 
average. 
18 Unfortunately for deriving unambiguous interpretations, there could be positive scale effects that small 
countries miss, offsetting the negative scale effects of getting more aid in small countries.   28
growth regressions with a typical sample of around 100 observations – and aid was not even 
one of the 145! The constructive thing that one can say is that data mining would manifest 
itself as a lack of robustness of results – changes in both the magnitude and significance of 
the aid coefficient. The failure of ELR to confirm BD is suggestive of this lack of robustness.  
Sometimes the critics of aid-causes-growth models have been alleged to confuse 
“absence of evidence” with “evidence of absence” of a growth effect of aid. The predicted value 
for the aid coefficient under the “Two Gap Model” of the 1960s that expanded on the “Big Push” 
model of the 1950s was around 0.2 to 0.5, so this model is strongly rejected by any estimates with 
an upper confidence bound below such a range.
19 In the end, despite vast effort, the literature 
has failed to produce such a large (or any) positive causal effect of aid on growth that 
survives robustness checks, failing to confirm the prediction of the Big Push/Two Gap 
model. This resonates again with the stylized fact that African growth outcomes have been 
uniquely poor, and yet Africa is the most aid-intensive continent. To believe in a positive 
growth effect of aid, one needs to believe in the counterfactual that African growth would 
have been even worse in the absence of aid (not impossible, but harder to believe than if 
growth had been respectable). Given the figures shown above where the median aid received 
since independence (around 1965) was around 10 percent of GDP (Figure 4) and the per 
capita growth outcome was roughly zero percent (Figure 1), the implausible counterfactual 
implied by the “Big Push” coefficient of [0.2,0.5] is that the median African growth would 
                                                 
19 The Two Gap model assumed that all aid went into investment, and that the coefficient on investment for 
predicting growth was 0.2 to 0.5 (reflecting what was called the Incremental Capital Output Ratio of 
between 2 and 5). In a simple exercise for this paper, I went to the extreme of a simple bivariate regression 
of per capita growth 1961-2005 on the aid to Gross National Income ratio, 1961-2005, using the log of 
population in 1960 as an instrument for aid (as noted above, probably the best, albeit highly imperfect 
instrument for aid). There is a problem of omitted variables in the growth regression, but under the 
admittedly wildly heroic assumption that population does not affect the omitted variables, the IV procedure 
also corrects for omitted variable bias (the saving grace may also be that nothing much seems to be robust 
in growth regressions anyway). The first stage shows the initial log of population to be free of weak 
instrument problems. The second stage regression shows a slightly negative coefficient on aid in the growth 
regression. The confidence interval for the coefficient of aid on growth is [-.126, 0.047], hence 0.2 is 
strongly rejected.    29
have been -2 to -5 percent per capita in the absence of the aid “Big Push" since independence. 
As far as the better performance in the rest of the world, even proponents of more rigorous 
randomized evaluation methods (to be discussed below) like Banerjee (2007) have some 
intuition about the limited role of aid in successes outside of Africa: “my sense is that {the 
dramatic reduction in world poverty between 1981 and 2001} was driven largely by events in 
India and China, where donors had very little impact.”
20
B.  Project interventions 
Another approach to “saving Africa” is to try to deal directly with some of the root causes 
of Africa’s poverty (in other words, directly attack some Factor X’s). At first blush, it would 
seem to be easy for donors to finance some productive public goods – just pave the roads! Just 
drill some boreholes! Just give farmers fertilizer! In terms of the poverty trap and fundamentals 
model, the intervention to increase Factor X could either be motivated by an attempt to escape the 
poverty trap (the “transformational” case that the development impact of the increase in X is very 
large) or by an attempt to improve the fundamentals so as to shift income higher in Africa (with a 
more “marginal” payoff). 
Indeed because the results are so tangible and visible, this survey will argue that aid to 
Africa has probably been more successful at achieving some project successes than it has been at 
other approaches to aid. However, the aid industry still felt that the results of the project approach 
were sufficiently disappointing (from a “transformational” viewpoint) that it shifted away from it 
strongly. We will see an interesting escalation in the literature and in policy, with the West first 
trying to fix those project-specific X’s that are more amenable to outside fixes, with at least some 
success but still a disappointing growth payoff (i.e. the results seemed to be marginal rather than 
                                                 
20 Banerjee contrasts his interpretation to that of Goldin, Rogers, and Stern 2007, who attribute global 
poverty reduction to foreign aid, as an example of how stylized facts fail to induce consensus. However, 
Goldin, Stern, and Rogers 2002 was the original source of their conclusion, and this was not a research 
study but a World Bank advocacy effort (“The Case for Aid”) to increase foreign aid in the run-up to the 
UN Monterrey Conference in 2002.     30
transformational), followed by “transformational” attempts at more systemic changes to be 
discussed in the following section. 
Most of the emphasis in project-specific efforts has been in addressing problems of 
illiteracy, disease, low agricultural productivity (possibly linked to land tenure practices, to be 
discussed more in the “institutions” section below), and poor social and physical infrastructure. 
These efforts have a long history. In an extreme example of the recycling of aid ideas across 
generations, a 1938 survey of colonial Africa commissioned by the British (the “Hailey report”) 
covered some of the same problems and even proposed some of the same solutions as the 2005 
UN Millennium Project that comprehensively surveyed aid interventions, as shown in Table 5. It 
would be hard to argue that Africa’s development problem is missing technical knowledge, as 
some transformational approaches claim, when some of that knowledge has already been around 
for 70 years. For example, why is there still malnutrition in Africa due to lack of vitamin A, when 
this problem and its solution has been well known for 70 years?   31
Table 5: The Similarity of Old and New Recommendations for Technical Interventions in Africa 
African problem 
to be addressed 
Committee of the African Research 
Survey, 1938 (headed by Lord 
Hailey) 
UN Millennium Project, 2005 (headed by Jeffrey 
Sachs) 
Malaria  {Steps to control malaria in 
European homes include} mosquito 
screening, mosquito bed-nets, and 
the use of insecticidal sprays….in 
certain native areas…malaria control 
by the spraying of native huts with a 
preparation of pyrethrum (p. 1126) 
the public good will best be served by the free 
provision of insecticide-treated nets, application 
of residual insecticides, and provision of effective 
antimalarial medicines and diagnostics…. 
insecticides for indoor residual spraying (mainly 




Whether the African eats enough 
food and, if he does whether it is of 
the right kind, and whether the 
attack on poor nutrition may not be 
the most important factor in 
reducing disease…the African 
suffers from deficiency of Vitamin 
A (pp. 1122-1123) 
Chronic undernourishment is caused by a … lack 
of access to food of sufficient quality and 
quantity…. It results in … high child mortality 
brought about by associated 
diseases…Malnutrition {is also} caused by 
inadequate intake of …{micronutrients such as} 
vitamin A (p.3 Hunger Task Force summary 
report,p. 128, Hunger Task Force full report) 
Soil fertility  “methods of improving soil fertility 
{such as} green manuring” (p. 962) 
 “using green manure to improve soil fertility” (p. 
107 Hunger Task force main report) 
Soil erosion and 
deforestation 
“soil erosion has become recognized 
as one of the major problems ...” (p. 
1056) “Since the destruction of 
vegetal cover is the prime cause, the 
restoration of such cover is the 
obvious remedy.” (p. 1063) “The 
most ancient, universal and effective 
method of increasing absorption and 
reducing runoff on cultivated land is 
the use of terraces.” (p. 1064) 
“severely degraded soils…often suffer from 
unchecked erosion… (p. 107, Hunger Task force 
main report) “the overharvesting of vegetation, 
stripping landscapes of their forest and plant 
cover and destroying riparian vegetation… 
increases the risks of … erosion. (pp. 172-173) 
Contour terraces, necessary on sloping lands… 
when furnished with grasses and trees…{to 
avoid} soil erosion (p. 113) 
 
Land tenure   “all discussions on the subject agree 
as to the value of giving security to 
the occupier of land… legal security 
against attack or disturbance can 
most effectively be guaranteed by 
registration.” (pp. 868, 876) 
 
“The rule of law involves security in private 
property and tenure rights … upholding the rule 
of law requires institutions for government 
accountability… this requires a well functioning 
and adequately paid civil service and judiciary, 
proper information technology (for registration of 
property …)” (pp. 31, 111) 
Clean drinking 
water 
Description of sinking boreholes in 
various African countries (pp. 1033-
1052) 
“Increase the share of boreholes to half the share 
of improved dug wells” (Water and Sanitation 
Task Force, p. 105) 
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a.  Overall record of projects 
i.  Old evidence from project rates of return 
Before turning to a discussion of the details of Western efforts in each sector, it is useful to 
survey the overall record of the project approach. The first kind of evidence is ex-post rates of 
return to aid projects, usually calculated by the aid agency or even the individual doing the 
project (and so probably biased upwards). In the first few decades of foreign aid, these rates of 
return were in the positive double-digit range. The literature discussed the “micro-macro” 
paradox, in which project returns to aid were high and yet as we have seen, the literature often 
failed to find an overall growth payoff to aid (see discussion in Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008). 
Later evidence on projects was not as favorable. The World Bank commissioned a study (known 
as “the Wapenhans report,” World Bank 1992) of World Bank project performance, as measured 
by the percent of projects classified as successful (again done by project managers and thus 
probably biased upward).  Even with the probable upward bias, only 59 percent of projects in 
Africa were classified as “successful,” compared to 74 percent worldwide for World Bank 
projects. 
ii.  New evidence of randomized controlled trials  
The calculation of project rates of return had a number of problems. The estimation of the 
benefits of the project were done in an ad-hoc way that left a lot of room for subjective 
judgments. This was particularly problematic because the aid agency  (and sometimes the specific 
individual who had led the project effort) were the ones calculating rates of return, implying a 
possible conflict of interest that would bias rates of return upwards. Even if the evaluators were 
completely objective, there was no mechanism to regulate their subjective judgments so that 
hypothesized benefits corresponded to real improvements enjoyed by the beneficiaries. 
  A much more rigorous way to assess aid-financed interventions has blossomed in the 
literature in recent years – the use of randomized evaluations. These measure the impact on some 
measure of well-being of an intervention in a randomly selected treatment group, as compared to   33
the randomly selected control group. This literature has found many aid project interventions to 
have positive benefits and to be cost-effective  (Banerjee 2008 and Duflo and Kremer 2008).  
Based on this encouraging evidence, Banerjee has written positively about the potential of such 
(marginal) aid in his book Making Aid Work (2007).  This literature offers its methodology as an 
improvement not only on subjective rate of return calculations, but even more as an improvement 
over aggregate cross-country regressions, such as those described above estimating the effect of 
aid on growth.  
  The REs became a popular methodology because of the great vacuum of evidence on 
development projects. As Pritchett (2008) says eloquently: 
nearly all World Bank discussion of polices or project design had the character “ignorant armies 
clashing by night.” There was heated debate among advocates of various activities but very rarely 
any firm evidence presented and considered about the likely impact of the proposed actions. 
Certainly in my experience, there was never any definitive evidence that would inform decisions 
of … funding one instrument versus another (e.g., vaccinations versus public education about 
hygiene to improve health, textbook reform versus teacher training to improve educational 
quality.) 
 
As even a World Bank handbook said “Despite the billions of dollars spent on development 
assistance each year, there is still very little known about the actual impact of projects on the 
poor” (Baker 2000). At the very least, the RE literature successfully dramatized the case for 
basing aid policy on evidence rather than on prejudice and special interests. 
The case for REs being a major advance over cross-country empirics rests on several 
strong claims. First, and most importantly, the RE literature claims to have solved the 
identification problem. The random assignment to a treatment group is an instrument for the 
treatment, and one can then calculate the causal effect of the treatment on the chosen outcome. 
This does qualify as a major advance on identification in empirical development work.
21  
Second, the RE literature claims to be free from the data mining problem we have 
discussed above for cross-country regressions. One is simply doing one pre-specified regression 
                                                 
21However, even this is disputed by Deaton (2008) who discusses problematic assumptions, what parameter 
is really being estimated, and just what “identification” really means.   34
of outcome on treatment, so even researchers with the same “searching for significance” 
motivation as those doing aggregate regressions will have their hands tied. Unfortunately, this 
claim is a little overblown for several reasons. First, there will often be more than one outcome 
measure, and researchers often emphasize those outcome regressions that show significant 
treatment effects, without adequately taking into account that such a result may be random if 
there are many outcomes to choose from. Second, researchers often report results from an ex-post 
slice of the sample, and they will naturally report mainly those ex-post slices that are significant. 
Third, researchers often include as other covariates some individual characteristics that affect 
outcomes, as a way to reduce the standard error on the treatment dummy. However, choosing 
which covariates to include is something like choosing which RHS variables to include in a 
growth regression – it is not obvious ex-ante. Hence, researchers could be (unconsciously) 
searching among covariates until one achieves a significant effect of treatment. Duflo, 
Glennester, and Kremer 2008 acknowledge these problems and recommend full disclosure, which 
is commendable, but this is hard to enforce. The scope for data mining still may be less than in 
cross country regressions. 
Duflo (2004) has argued that REs present a simple form of unambiguous evidence that is 
more likely to influence policy than other kinds of empirical development work. Here, the great 
success story is PROGRESA in Mexico, which was scaled up and continued under two different 
administrations due in part to the positive results from REs evaluating PROGRESA (Levy 2006).  
Of course, there were also political factors. Green (2005) found that, despite the attempt to de-
politicize PROGRESA, municipalities that had previously voted for the party in power were more 
likely to have their localities enrolled in the program. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2008) dispute that 
finding, but found that even a non-discretionary PROGRESA/ OPORTUNIDADES program paid 
off at the polls for the incumbent in both the 2000 and 2006 elections. They also point out that 
President Vicente Fox’s decision to expand OPORTUNIDADES from rural areas to the cities 
made political sense since his party’s political base was urban.    35
There are also clear failures of REs to translate into program adoption, such as the 
Colombia private school vouchers that received accolades from one of the most famous REs of 
all (Angrist et al.2002 ) and yet was discontinued and never revived in Colombia (the cancellation 
of the program goes curiously unmentioned in the large literature citing Angrist et al.). Moreover, 
most governments are unwilling to even do REs, so most results in the literature are based on 
NGO projects, not government projects. Pritchett 2008 argues that a model of government 
behavior as driven by economists’ normative recommendations performs very poorly as a 
positive model (using education as an example). As Pritchett says:  
the randomization agenda as a methodological approach inherits an enormous internal 
contradiction—that all empirical claims should only be believed when backed by evidence from 
randomization excepting of course those enormous (and completely unsupported) empirical 
claims about the impact of randomization on policy. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, critics such as Deaton (2007, 2008) and Rodrik 2008 point out 
that while the strong claim to identification of RE may hold for internal validity, they don’t 
necessarily extrapolate to other settings than the experimental situation. (The same problem 
appears in aggregate econometrics, as we saw above, where the variation (in e.g. aid) associated 
with an instrument’s variation may have different effects than other variation in aid. It is also very 
possible that different regions have different coefficients on some RHS variable – such as aid -- in 
aggregate regressions.) Cartwright 2007 (quoted in Deaton 2008) points out that REs do “not tell 
us what the overall outcome on the effect in question would be from introducing the treatment in 
some particular way in an uncontrolled situation, even if we consider introducing it only in the 
very population sampled. For that we need a causal model.” 
RE proponents (e.g. Duflo, Glennester, Kremer 2008) respond that REs can be replicated 
in many different settings to confirm a general result. However, as they acknowledge, the 
incentives for researchers to do replications fall off very rapidly with number of replications 
already performed, and it is unclear how many you need or how to choose the right sample of 
environments (with what factors varying?) to validate a result from the original study. This   36
survey will report RE results from any environments that have seen studies (including outside of 
Africa), just as with aggregate evidence, the presumption will be that evidence from outside of 
Africa applies also to Africa, unless we have a good reason to think otherwise. 
The biggest problem is the absence of a model to clarify why, when, and where the 
treatment is expected to work (Deaton 2008). An RE is most useful when it sheds light on some 
behavioral response (e.g. the price elasticity of demand for health inputs, to be discussed below), 
although even then it may not extrapolate to other settings; it is less useful when it makes a 
blanket claim that “X works but not Y” based on one very small sample in a particular context, 
without any clear intuition as to why X is more likely to work than Y. Rodrik 2008 points out that 
to go from RE results to policy often involves the same kinds of appeals to theoretical priors, 
common sense, casual empirics about similarity of the new policy setting to the original research 
setting in some (but not all) aspects, and other more casual sources of evidence that are not much 
different from using aggregate econometric results and stylized facts to influence policy. 
This methodology could also work as an evaluation of whether THAT NGO or aid 
agency’s project worked on THAT occasion, which could be useful for holding aid agencies 
accountable for results. However, RE proponents like Duflo and Kremer (2008) have voiced 
opposition to any scheme that would reward or penalize particular aid actors for positive or 
negative results of evaluations.
22 They object in part because they need the cooperation of the 
implementing agency to do an RE. If the agency felt threatened by a negative result or perceived 
great rewards to a positive result, they might fake the results. The problem with this argument is 
that either the existing RE system already contains considerable rewards for positive REs (as 
debated above) or the RE proponents want to redesign the aid system to do so. Duflo (2004) says: 
                                                 
22 See the discussion on the Creative Capitalism web site: “Holding aid agencies accountable,” An email 
exchange between William Easterly, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer, July 31, 2008, 
http://creativecapitalism.typepad.com/creative_capitalism/2008/07/exchange.html 
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“Positive results, on the other hand, can help build a consensus for the project, which has the 
potential to be extended far beyond the scale that was initially envisioned.” It is hard to imagine 
that an implementing agency or its staff would be indifferent to a large increase in its budget from 
scaling up, not to mention kudos for having found a very successful intervention. Ravallion 2008 
argues with such motives in mind that agencies selectively agree to REs where they are already 
confident a program is working, so the probability of a positive evaluation is biased upwards. The 
cost of such aid evaluation may also be prohibitive, but if costs can be low enough relative to the 
benefits of the project perhaps the use of REs for accountability should be explored further (and, 
in any case, more attention should be paid to incentives of agencies to manipulate results). 
Lastly, this methodology does not address the general equilibrium effects of a marginal 
aid project, to be discussed next. 
These many criticisms and caveats make clear that REs are far from being a panacea in 
development, or even just to “make aid work,” and the RE proponents overstate their potential. 
REs are neither necessary nor sufficient to verify that a development intervention is working in 
general. The proponents have been overly dogmatic in dismissing other forms of evidence, which 
has hampered mutual learning from practitioners of different methodologies in development 
empirics.  
The REs do represent progress in having added to the kit of empirical researchers a tool 
that alters priors of both other academics and policymakers when there is a strong result 
(particularly if it helps test a behavioral model). The effect on priors is perhaps the real acid test 
that this methodology has something to contribute, even if not as much as its proponents claim.  
The debate on REs vs. other forms of econometric or case study evidence has perhaps 
obscured a far more important divide in the world of aid practice – that between those who feel 
bound by objective evidence and those who do not.  The RE methodology has had a positive 
demonstration effect showing the scientific method can be applied with marginal interventions, in 
an aid world that too often ignores ANY existing evidence (or any need to find such evidence).   38
Aggregate econometric work suffers from many problems, but the best examples of such work try 
to resolve problems such as identification and data mining, showing that they also take the 
scientific method seriously. In contrast, too much aid practice doesn’t bother with seeking 
objective evidence, or ignores evidence that does exist. Banerjee 2007 gives the example of a 
computer kiosk program for the poor in India that often didn’t work because of unreliable 
electricity supply and bad telephone connectivity that failed to connect to the Internet 
(interestingly, a few descriptive sentences on this convinced Banerjee, not an RE). Yet the World 
Bank’s  “Empowerment Sourcebook” said: “Following the success of the initiative….”. Even 
more incredibly, another long-time aid official still defended the World Bank Sourcebook 
after hearing Banerjee’s example by saying the World Bank only intended to help achieve 
“greater empowerment.” Banerjee responds: “Helped to achieve greater empowerment? 
Through non-working computers?” (see Banerjee 2007, p. 77, 112) 
Is the RE literature clearly marginal rather than transformational? RE proponents have 
some of the same difficulty resisting the siren song of transformation as anyone else. Duflo and 
Kremer 2008 close an article with these words:  
{RE is } credibly establishing which programs work and which do not, {so} the international 
agencies can counteract skepticism about the possibility of spending aid effectively and build 
long-term support for development. Just as randomized trials revolutionized medicine in the 
twentieth century, they have the possibility to revolutionize social policy during the twenty-first. 
 
Similarly, Banerjee (2007) said right after his skeptical remarks about “growth policy” 
quoted in the introduction: “Social policy may be the best thing that we can do for growth to 
happen and micro-evidence on how to do it well, may turn out to be the key to growth success.” It 
is ironic that testing these large claims for the RE methodology cannot be done with RE 
methodology and would instead require the very big-picture kinds of evidence that the RE 
proponents disparage. Even the most casual empiricism would detect the lack of any obvious 
examples of country-wide escapes from poverty using policies determined by REs. So despite the 
rhetoric of some RE proponents, REs mainly seem useful as a way to sometimes (especially when   39
sufficiently tied to a behavioral model) influence outside donor decisions on marginal 
interventions that have previously operated in a vacuum of evidence. I will discuss particular REs 
relevant to each of the sectors I discuss below. 
iii.  General equilibrium effects 
The aid literature has worried about whether the evidence of positive project impacts is 
enough to suggest a significant positive impact of aid. Rajan and Subramanian 2008 pointed out 
that the micro-macro paradox still holds with the new randomized evaluation literature, with 
positive returns to micro projects yet apparently still zero macro growth payoff.  I will consider 
more systemic approaches to aid below, but here I stay within the confines of the project 
approach to discuss two issues that are often raised in the literature: fungibility and 
implementation. Note that these arguments are often used to justify more sweeping 
transformational approaches themselves, but whether they are valid concerns is a separate 
question than whether the transformational approach is the right one. 
1.  Problem of fungibility,  
The fungibility concern recognizes that if the government receives an aid transfer for good 
purpose A, that transfer frees up the government’s own money previously spent on A for some 
other (possibly bad) purpose B. In this case, the true effect of the aid is to finance the other 
increased spending B that would not have happened without aid to the donor-favored purpose A. 
As Paul Rosenstein-Rodan said colorfully way back in 1953, you might think you are financing a 
power plant when in fact you are financing a brothel. Fungibility has been explicitly tested in the 
aid to Africa literature.  Swaroop and Devarajan 2000 and Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu 1998 
both find significant but less than 100 percent aid fungibility across sectors. Even with partial 
fungibility, unfortunately, the rate of return to an aid-financed project is not the same as the 
general equilibrium rate of return to aid spending. 
2.  interaction with incentives on implementation   40
The second problem with evaluating the benefits of aid spending is one of 
implementation. If an RE shows positive results from a particular project or intervention that is 
executed, it does not follow that giving aid for that purpose will automatically result in project 
execution. As Reinikka and Svensson 2005 argue:  
 
When scaling-up a specific program found to work in a controlled experiment run by a specific 
organization (often an NGO with substantial assistance from the research team), it is crucial also 
to have an understanding of the whole delivery chain; from the institutional constrains that affect 
central government policy decisions, through the incentive constraints that influence different 
layers of government agencies and officials implementing a given policy, to the actions and 
incentives of the end-producers (schools) and beneficiaries (students and parents). Lack of 
attention to the service delivery system, and adjustment of policy accordingly, may imply effects 
very different from what a simple extrapolation of the estimates of the controlled experiment 
produces. 
 
Incentive problems have been a major theme of the literature on health and education in 
Africa (often called “systems issues,” as in you cannot expect good health outcomes if the public 
health system is dysfunctional). While educational enrollments have expanded rapidly, the quality 
of education is hampered by missing inputs like textbooks and other school materials, weak 
incentives for teachers to show up or teach effectively, corruption in education bureaucracies, 
appointment of unqualified teachers for patronage reasons, and disruption of schooling by 
political events (Filmer and Pritchett 1999). Donors have long recognized the quality problems in 
education (for example, World Bank WDR 1980), but these problems are remarkably persistent 
(World Bank WDR 2007 again stressed quality problems in education). 
 In health, corruption in the health system (studies in Guinea, Cameroon, Uganda, and 
Tanzania estimated that 30 to 70 percent of government drugs disappeared before reaching the 
patients), absenteeism of health workers, and sheer bureaucratic inefficiency are chronic 
problems. Some widely-cited regressions find no impact of health spending on health outcomes 
(Filmer, Hammer, and Pritchett 2000, Pritchett and Woolcock 2004).
23  
                                                 
23 Sachs (2005, 2008) has argued that Africa’s health is particularly disfavored by an ecology favorable to 
the most lethal kind of malaria. Skeptics wonder why donors and governments cannot respond by adopting   41
The RE literature has itself documented the weak incentives facing public servants to 
provide services. Chaudhury, Hammer, Kremer, Muralidharan, and Rogers 2006 surveyed studies 
in Bangladesh, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Peru, and Uganda where unannounced visits to schools 
and health clinics found teachers absent 19 percent of the time on average and health workers 
absent 35 percent of the time. Even this was an understatement as some who were present were 
not working. We can understand this as reflecting weak sanctions for absence: in a sample of 
3000 Indian schools, there was only one report of a teacher fired for repeated absences. The 
problem of teacher and health absence is worse in poorer countries or states within countries (e.g. 
the one African country, Uganda, has a worse problem than richer countries in the study). There 
is some evidence of response to incentives.  Teachers in an NGO program of non-formal schools 
in India that were required to take a date-stamped picture of themselves with students everyday, 
with a pay bonus for each additional day of attendance, had a much lower absence rate – 22 
percent compared to 42 percent in the control group (Duflo and Hanna 2005).  
 With doubts about implementation, a research project studying a health or education 
intervention whose execution is guaranteed by the design of the research project tells us little 
about how effective will be health or education aid in achieving that execution in the existing 
system of public services. The RE literature does not seem to have a good answer to this 
conundrum, although to be fair these studies often seem to envision NGOs doing the intervention 
rather than the government. However, since many interventions can only be brought to a large 
scale by the government, the larger policy interpretation of many RE claims that “Intervention X 
works” are in doubt.  
We see similar implementation problems in infrastructure. Since independence, there has 
been much road building and expansion of electric generating capacity and water supply, 
                                                                                                                                                 
fairly low-cost treatment and prevention of malaria. The colonial authorities controlled malaria 
successfully controlled in some places and periods where there were strong incentives to do so. Utzinger, 
Tozan, and Singer 2002 discuss successful malaria control in the Zambian copper mining belt during the 
colonial period. Caldas de Castro et al. 2004 discuss a successful program to control malaria in Dar es 
Salaam before World War I.     42
supporting the idea that aid is more productive when directed to specific, piecemeal interventions. 
However, there has been a chronic underinvestment in maintenance of infrastructure. For 
example, donors (and the recipient governments) have the incentive to build highly visible new 
roads, but less incentive to provide invisible maintenance.  
The bias against operations and maintenance in infrastructure has been known for 
decades -- highlighted for example in World Bank (1981, 1988, 1994), with each succeeding 
report bewailing the failure to make progress since the previous report -- and it remains a problem 
today.
24 The results are chronically potholed and cratered donor-financed roads, for example, 
always being reconstructed and then deteriorating again. This is another example of inability to 
learn from past mistakes.  
Kremer and Miguel 2007 suggest the problem is the donors’ obsession with 
“sustainability,” in which they envision the recipient government or local communities providing 
the financing of recurrent costs (operations and maintenance) after donors finance the capital 
costs of infrastructure, so that the project will be “sustained” once donor financing ends. This 
hope has turned out to be an illusion, as the failure to cover recurrent costs has been nearly 
universal. Kremer and Miguel suggest donors should be willing to permanently bear the recurrent 
costs of their projects if they really want those projects to be effective.  This is again the conflict 
between the “transformational” view of projects, in which a project will lead to a permanent 
systemic improvement with “sustainability,” versus the “marginal” view of Kremer and Miguel 
that the project should just be assured of having lasting positive benefits.  
Of course, if Kremer and Miguel’s analysis is extended into a proposal for the donors to 
take over completely any and all aspects of any public service that yields positive benefits, then 
once again one would have to worry about the fungibility question – wouldn’t the resulting 
equilibrium be that domestic government spending would be completely redirected to 
unproductive uses? Still, the fungibility question does not completely destroy the information 
                                                 
24 A nice survey on road maintenance is in Peterson (2008).   43
content of finding positive project returns to aid projects. Fungibility is generally significantly 
less than 100 percent in empirical studies, so its effect is to scale down the positive effect of a 
project rather than to reverse or eliminate it.
25  
Fungibility and implementation problems are often used to justify a movement towards a 
another kind of transformational approach to project aid: namely the aid donor should review all 
public expenditure and reform the civil service and do “capacity-building” so as to create civil 
servants who had the capacity to spend money on the right things and implement things 
effectively.  This kind of approach increasingly got bundled together with major economic policy 
reforms in the “structural adjustment” era after 1980 to be discussed below. The World Bank did 
70 civil service reforms in Africa during 1987-97, and over a quarter of World Bank lending to 
Africa is currently devoted to “capacity-building.” Yet political scientists specializing in 
analyzing African states see little sign of effect of these Herculean efforts at making civil servants 
perform better, even seeing some signs of decline (Moss et al. 2008). The transformational 
response to fungibility and implementation problems was not so constructive. 
 
b. International collective action on outcomes affected by project aid 
An alternative transformational approach to most of the social indicators affected by 
project aid was for the United Nations to announce targets for social indicators like primary 
enrollment and child mortality for some date 10-15 years in the future, such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) set for 2015 in a UN Summit in 2000. This was supposed to induce 
greater effort by international aid agencies and poor country governments to improve these 
indicators, and the MDGs have been remarkably successful in capturing the attention of official 
agencies. The goal-setting approach is in the “transformational” camp because the goals imply a 
                                                 
25 The exception would be if fungibility allows an increase in government spending elsewhere that is 
positively harmful, such as spending on armed forces that will harm the local population or neighbors (for 
example, Uganda was a donor favorite during the period its army were accused of atrocities in the civil war 
in the Congo).   44
very large improvement in development outcomes, and the intention in improving the social 
indicators is to launch the country as a whole into self-sustained growth.  
There is also an analogue to the Big Push/Two Gap approach to aid and growth in the 
MDG discussion, as increased aid is predicted to mechanically increase social indicators such that 
MDGs are attained, given minimum good government: “aid ‘will ensure that no country 
genuinely committed to poverty reduction, good governance and economic reform, will be denied 
the chance to achieve the Millennium Goals through lack of finance.’”
26 The same mechanical 
approach shows up in exercises that calculate the “costs” of achieving the MDGs, and then leaps 
to the non sequitur that raising aid by an amount equal to those “costs” will in fact achieve the 
MDGs.  
Even as skeptical and rigorous an economist as Banerjee (2007) cannot resist the appeal 
of a mechanical calculation of scaling up to show that aid money will help achieve worthy goals 
if directed to the right things. Banerjee first chooses programs that have been verified to “work” 
by RE, second saying “the way we calculate costs is to take a point estimate of the per person 
cost for each program,” and third, multiplies this per person cost by the number of eligible 
beneficiaries. 
A much quoted study by Devarajan et al. (2002) of such a costing exercise came up with 
a price tag of $40-60 billion. Devarajan et al.themselves are too good as economists to take their 
own estimates seriously – for example, they note about their cost calculation for the health and 
education MDGs that “empirical evidence from developing countries suggests only a weak link 
between public spending on education and school enrollments, or between health expenditures 
and mortality or disease.”  
Taken literally, this approach was not successful as the goals were very seldom met, and 
the same goal was postponed to a later date for another international campaign. Education was a 
                                                 
26From a report by the Africa Progress Panel (2008), a taskforce headed by Kofi Annan and made up of 
prominent African and non-African leaders to follow up on the Blair Commission for Africa (2005). The 
statement was originally made at a G-8 summit in 2002.    45
good example of this, with one of the goals of the Millennium Development Goal campaign to 
achieve universal primary enrollment by 2015, a goal that is most relevant to Africa since it is the 
main region still lagging behind on this indicator (despite rapid progress to be noted below). 
Clemens (2004) notes about the education goal that “Roughly once every two decades since the 
Second World War, an international gathering of policymakers has solemnly promised to achieve 
universal primary education in developing countries by about twenty years thereafter.”  A series 
of UNESCO conferences in the early 1960s set Universal Primary Enrollment as a goal for 1980. 
When that was not met, a series of new UN summits reset the goal for 2000.  As 2000 came 
without such achievement, the UN’s Millennium Development Goals summit in that year made 
another promise to achieve universal enrollment by 2015. Similarly for infrastructure, a previous 
summit in 1977 set the goal of universal access to water and sanitation – 2015 targets for the 
Millennium Development Goals -- for 1990.
27 So missing the goals did not seem to induce any 
change in behavior for those who favored this approach, since they simply repeated the exercise 
for a future date.  
The international goals approach has some obvious theoretical flaws. It sets up an 
international collective action problem, with multiple agents (many official aid agencies plus 
many aid recipient governments) who face a serious free rider problem, with the result that no 
one actor faced any consequences for failing to meet the goal. For a single agent, having multiple 
goals is like having multiple principals, which is well known to weaken incentives for the agent 
because principals’ incentives for the agent to work on their goal cancel out each other. Finally, 
to make things even worse, even if there were only one agent and one goal, the Millennium 
Development Goals are broad outcome measures where it is very difficult to attribute social 
outcomes to aid efforts, since the outcomes also depend on many other things, including the 
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important but often-overlooked incentives of local public and private actors to make progress in 
the areas covered by the Goals. Hence, the incentives for action created by international targets 
seem to be very weak indeed (and even then the action seems to be more oriented toward 
increasing total aid dollars rather than improving effectiveness of that spending to produce better 
outcomes). Pande (2006) says it perhaps most clearly: “if we are to succeed in designing and 
implementing policies which bring about development then we need to be both more modest 
in what we expect to achieve solely through the setting of appropriate goals, and much more 
ambitious in trying to understand the incentives facing individuals, institutions and 
governments in developing countries.” 
Defenders of these goal-setting exercises suggest they increase the aspirations of some or 
all of the aid agents, leading to positive results. They do seem to have recently been successful in 
contributing to the international advocacy for aid to Africa (as discussed in the introduction). 
However, given the repeated lack of success in attaining goals, the goals approach seems like 
another example of cyclical fashions, i.e. of failure to learn in the African aid effort. It is also 
another example of exaggerating the potential impact of outside actions. 
In line with the theme of this paper, the Millennium Development Goals were very much 
a “transformational” exercise, in that they implicitly committed aid agencies to “do everything at 
once,” to fix ALL the problems of poverty in one fell swoop. This reflects a shift in aid thinking 
towards more comprehensive approaches that began in the 1990s (reflected at the time in World 
Bank President James Wolfensohn’s “Comprehensive Development Framework”.)  This was a 
shift towards an even more ambitious agenda (including almost every possible dimension of 
development such as “faith and development” and “women’s empowerment”) than even the more 
modest transformational idea of aid creating economic growth, again reflecting the escalation 
theme. 
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d.  Aid and social indicators 
i.  Education 
1.  Trends in education and micro evidence 
Despite the implementation problems stated above, education is a relative success story in Africa 
since independence. Primary enrollment started off very low and then rapidly caught up to other 
developing countries (figure 7). There was a lot of donor involvement in education – is this an 
area where aid helped shift a fundamental determinant of development in a way that helped “save 
Africa”? A pattern we will see recur is a global trend towards improvement of social indicators, 
which includes Africa (as pointed out by Kenny (2006)). Of course, aid to the poorest countries 
could have played a role in this improvement. There is an obvious long run global trend towards 
increasing enrollments (Kenny 2008c); developing countries since 1960 have raised enrollments 
faster than today’s rich countries did in their history (Clemens 2004).  The brute stylized fact is 
that donors intended to increase education with aid, they spent money building schools, and 
enrollment did increase – such evidence is suggestive even if far from definitive.   48
Figure 7: Relative Education Peformance in Africa 





















































The randomization literature has found a number of aid interventions (both inside and 
outside Africa) to be effective in education. Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (KMT) 2007 found 
that a merit scholarship for high school girls in Kenya seemed to induce greater study effort and 
increased the girls’ test scores, and even had some externalities to boys’ performance in the same 
classroom. In contrast, a program to give textbooks to students in Kenya did not increase test 
scores on average (Glewwe, Kremer, and Moulin 2007), a result that contrasts sharply with the 
previous literature (see e.g. Lockheed and Hanushek 1988; even education skeptics like Filmer 
and Pritchett 1999b argued there was a high payoff from textbooks).  The authors argue that 
Kenyan schools were oriented towards the strongest students (whose test scores did improve), 
while the weaker students suffered from lack of English skills (textbooks were in English) and 
greater absenteeism of both pupils and teachers. Vermeesch 2003 found that a school meals 
program in pre-schools in Kenya raised attendance rates from 21 percent to 29 percent. It did not   49
raise test scores on average, but did raise scores in schools with better-trained teachers. Note that 
the conditional conclusions in this paragraph are examples of ex-post slicing of the sample that 
this article discussed above as a sacrifice of econometric rigor in REs (including KMT 2007, 
where the merit scholarship worked in one sample site and not in the other). 
As noted earlier, Angrist et al. 2002 studied the effect of vouchers for private school 
distributed via a lottery in Colombia. The lottery winners had 0.12-0.16 additional years of 
schooling, test scores higher by 0.2 standard deviations, and higher secondary school completion 
(the latter confirmed in a follow-up study by Angrist, Bettinger, and Kremer 2006).  
This only scratches the surface of randomized studies on education inputs as shown by a 
statement like Kremer and Holla 2008:  
Evidence is also now accumulating on the effectiveness of certain school inputs like extra 
teachers and textbooks (Banerjee et al, 2005; Duflo, Dupas and Kremer, 2007; and Glewwe et al, 
2007), and provider incentives (Glewwe at al, 2008; and Muralidharan and Sundaramanan, 2007), 
remedial education (Banerjee et al, 2007; Duflo et al, 2007; He et al, 2007), citizens’ report cards, 
the hiring of contract teachers, or increased oversight of local school committees (Bjorkman and 
Svensson, 2007; and Duflo, Dupas and Kremer, 2007), school choice programs (Angrist et al, 
2002, 2006; Bettinger et al, 2007). 
 
It looks like the RE literature has offered a lot of particular aid interventions that “work” in 
education. Yet there is an air of randomness about which interventions work and which don’t, 
since the intuition distinguishing the two is not compelling. One has the worry stated earlier that 
such laundry lists of results tend to select out significant coefficients without enough information 
about how many different outcomes were tested, what results were based on ex post slices of the 
sample, and how many results depended on inclusion of covariates. Also the worry about how RE 
findings are very sensitive to context remains relevant. Deaton (2007) is articulate on this issue 
concerning one of the interventions cited here: 
The effectiveness of flip charts clearly depends on many things, of which the skill of the teacher 
and the age, background, and previous training of the children are only the most obvious. So a 
trial from a group of Kenyan schools gives us the average effectiveness of flip charts in the 
experimental schools relative to the control schools for an area in western Kenya, at a specific 
time, for specific teachers, and for specific pupils. It is far from clear that this evidence is useful 
outside of that situation.  
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Other RE studies seem more convincing and more robust. The famous Progresa program 
in Mexico to give cash grants to poor families in return for them keeping their children in school 
(subsequently known as conditional cash transfers (CCT)) has led to several influential studies 
using a randomized design. Schultz (2004) found that schooling among the beneficiaries did 
increase significantly, estimating the long run effect as 0.66 additional years of schooling on top 
of a baseline of 6.8 years of schooling. Behrman et al. 2005 came up with a similar estimate of 
0.7 additional years of schooling using different methods (including effects on dropout, re-entry, 
and grade repetition rates). There are a few pilots of CCTs underway in Africa that are being 
evaluated with a randomized design, but none of the evaluations are available yet as of September 
2008.
28 These studies seem more persuasive because they align well with theory – a sufficiently 
large incentive to keep kids in school, created by PROGRESA, trumps the incentive for families 
to use children as workers to earn income. 
Another famous RE finding on education offers some claims to robustness. The Kremer 
and Miguel 2004 study on treatment of children for worms in Kenya found that it reduced school 
absenteeism by one-quarter  (although it did not improve test scores). An interesting historical 
confirmation of this result is Bleakley 2007, who discusses the Rockefeller Foundation campaign 
against hookworm in the American South in the early 20th century. Bleakely also found strong 
effects on school attendance from decreasing worm infection.  Bobonis, Miguel, and Puri-Sharma 
2006 found that treatment of children with iron supplements, Vitamin A, and deworming for 
anemia reduced student absenteeism in pre-school by one-fifth in a district in India. This finding 
is thus an example of one that was successfully replicated in different settings.   
So one is left with the conclusion that some things work, but only under the right 
conditions, and only if they are actually implemented as opposed to falling prey to dysfunctional 
education systems. Even then, the REs are not directly relevant to the question of whether aid 
explained the relative success of education in Africa 1960-2005, since we have no information on 
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whether the donors did the interventions that REs evaluate. At best, the multiplication of 
“interventions that work” shifts priors that “donor efforts can pay off in education.” If so, then 
together with the stylized fact that enrollments rose in Africa at the same time as there was 
extensive donor involvement in African education, perhaps does shift priors that “aid works in 
education.” Otherwise, one is left with the feeling that aid could improve education, but the 
literature is not always that clear on when, why, or how. 
2.  Results from education 
Despite Africa’s success on raising primary enrollment, there has been disappointment 
that growth in education has not paid off in higher economic growth, as stressed in Pritchett 
(2001). Education has its own micro-macro paradox, as Mincer regressions usually show a 
positive impact of an individual’s educational attainment on their wages, but results from growth 
regressions and growth accounting suggest little or no aggregate payoff to society-wide 
education. Africa plays a large role in Pritchett’s results, as it contributes several dozen 
observations with low economic growth and rapid percent growth in schooling attainment. 
Krueger and Lindahl 2001 contradicted Pritchett with much more positive results showing a 
positive association between the absolute change in years of schooling and economic growth  -- 
this put the African low growth observations more in the middle of the sample compared to being 
at the top of the sample on percent growth in years of schooling, since initial schooling in Africa 
was so low. However, Pritchett (2006) lets micro and macro data arbitrate the functional form and 
finds that the best fit is closer to percent change than to absolute change. The poor outcome of 
educational improvements in Africa is consistent with the stylized fact that there is little job 
creation in the African formal private sector, which would normally be the employer of skilled 
labor (Pritchett 2006). Poor institutions could explain such an outcome, and poor institutions 
could also divert skilled labor into rent-seeking rather than productive activities. Even those who   52
argue strongly for a positive effect of education on growth concede that poor institutions and 
policies, as in Africa, prevent education from paying off (Hanushek and Wößmann 2008).
 29   
Another well-known and long-standing finding in the growth regression literature is 
between initial schooling (usually the primary enrollment rate) and subsequent growth rate, 
controlling for per capita income (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2003). Doppelhoffer et al. 2004 find 
that initial primary enrollment is the single best performing variables in a Bayesian exercise to 
decide what variables belong in the growth regression
30.  Hanushek and Kim 2000 and Hanushek 
and Wößmann 2008 stress initial quality (as measured by test scores) of education, and get 
stronger results with their test score variable than those for initial enrollment. Low primary 
enrollment quantity could have also been proxying for low schooling quality, since a 
dysfunctional education bureaucracy would plausibly produce both low quantity and low quality.  
However, Bils and Klenow 2000 had already raised some doubts about whether the 
relationship between education level and growth was causal, noting that the coefficient magnitude 
could be explained entirely by individuals’ investing in education in anticipation of high growth 
(which obviously raises future returns to skills). Easterly 2001 and Pritchett 2006 pointed out that 
a causal relationship between initial schooling and growth would predict accelerating growth with 
rising education in all developing regions, whereas the sample mean growth rates actually fell 
instead from the 60s through the 90s. Even if we accept as credible worldwide evidence on some 
growth payoff to initial level of schooling, there is considerable disappointment for Africa that 
                                                 
29 Another line of attack on the Pritchett results was that educational data was mismeasured, a problem that 
was amplified when considering the effect of changes in education on other outcomes. De La Fuente and 
Domenech 2006 found that higher quality OECD data led to a positive association between human capital 
growth and output growth. Unfortunately, the OECD countries also have better institutions and so don’t 
really help resolve the issue of the effect of education in Africa. Cohen and Soto 2007 also stress data 
quality problems and get a positive effect of growth on the change in years of schooling with an improved 
data set for developed and developing countries; unfortunately, we don’t know whether this is because of 
better quality data or whether they are just reproducing the Krueger and Lindahl finding that absolute 
changes work better than percent change in schooling to predict growth. Also Pritchett sometimes finds 
negative and significant coefficients of education growth on output growth, which could not be explained 
by poor quality data that would normally lead to attenuation bias. 
30 Technically, primary enrollment was second to the East Asian dummy, but the latter seems like a 
meaningless ex-post creation based on knowledge of East Asia’s high growth.   53
this payoff has not materialized despite successful efforts at expanding schooling, which again 
could reflect poor quality of schooling and/or low demand for skills related to poor institutions.
31  
We are left with little reason from the aggregate empirical literature to believe that rising 
education in Africa has paid off in higher per capita income or growth. This disappointment 
weakened the arguments of advocates of “marginal” project interventions and strengthened the 
case for “transformational” systemic changes, as we will see in the next section. 
ii.  Health 
1.  Trends on health in Africa 
Health is an even more clear success story than education in Africa, as child mortality has 
improved dramatically over time (Figure 8). There are well known and striking donor success 
stories, like the elimination of smallpox, the near-eradication of river blindness and Guinea worm, 
the spread of oral rehydration therapy for treating infant diarrheal diseases, DDT campaigns 
against malarial mosquitoes (although later halted for environmental reasons), and the success of 
WHO vaccination programs against measles and other childhood diseases. The aid campaign 
against diseases in Africa (known as vertical health programs, see discussion below) is likely the 
single biggest success story in the history of aid to Africa  (see Levine 2007). 
  In this case, the clear verdict of the case studies is probably a lot more helpful than the 
aggregate stylized facts, aggregate econometrics, or REs. Under-five mortality fell dramatically in 
Africa, but it fell by somewhat less than in other developing countries (figure 8 again). We ideally 
need to parcel out factors such as Africa’s lower growth (although the effect of growth on health 
is controversial), different disease ecology (for example, malaria is much more of a problem in 
                                                 
31 Of course, an association more supportive of strong education effects on development is the strong 
correlation in levels between years of schooling and per capita income. However, Acemoglu and Angrist 
2000 point out that the coefficient of income regressed on schooling across countries is far too large to be 
explained by private returns to education estimated from micro data (and the differences in schooling 
quantity are far too small to explain cross-country income differences); hence it requires externalities to 
education at the country level. These authors fail to find evidence of education externalities across US 
states, using a convincing identification strategy with state compulsory schooling and child labor laws as 
instruments.   54
Africa than any other region), other factors, and aid, not to mention finding an identification 
strategy to assess causal effects of aid; no such aggregate econometric efforts have been notably 
successful. Even with econometric support unavailable, perhaps Africa’s health performance is 
impressive after all given its lower growth and its more difficult disease ecology, which is 
consistent with the important role for aid shown by the case studies.  
  There is another sense in which the West had a major effect on health in Africa. The 
major technological breakthroughs in health – e.g. antibiotics, vaccines, the germ theory of 
disease, the identification of mosquito transmission of malaria, later the discovery of the AIDS 
virus – originated in the science of the West (see discussion in Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 
2006). The health improvements in Africa would have been impossible without Western science; 
this is one important way in which Western outsiders did indeed “save Africa,” at least in one 
specific area. Acemoglu and Johnson 2007 show empirically the strong effect of the international 
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Figure 8: Relative Health Performance in Africa 






















































Finally, randomized evaluations of also found positive impacts of a number of health 
interventions adopted by aid agencies or NGOs. First, many of the education interventions 
discussed above also had a health component. Gertler 2004 checked whether the PROGRESA 
cash-for-schooling program also had a major health impact, since the cash rewards were also 
conditional on families receiving micronutrients and protein supplements, and bringing their 
children to clinics for regular health and nutritional checkups.  For children covered by the 
program compared to the randomized control group, Gertler found significant effects of a 22-25 
percent decrease in probability of illness in the 4 weeks preceding the checkup, an impact on 
child height of 1 centimeter (although, puzzingly, not a significant decrease in probability of 
stunting), and a 25 percent decrease in probability of anemia. The nutritional success is notable 
when we remember that knowledge of the large payoff to cheap nutritional supplements has been 
around for decades (like Vitamin A in Table 5), and yet these still remain underutilized.  These   56
findings comprised another large part of the “Progresa Success Story” discussed above.  The 
Bobonis et al. 2008 study on anemia and school participation also found that iron supplements 
and deworming drugs were effective in increasing children’s weight-for-height and weight-for-
age scores. This might be thought to be obvious, except the impacts on direct measures of anemia 
and worm infection were surprisingly insignificant.  (Again, one worries about a pattern of some 
outcomes being significant – hence the intervention “works” - but other equally plausible ones are 
not. This makes it more difficult to interpret the significance level of a conclusion that an 
intervention “works.”) 
In contrast, the well-known Kremer and Miguel paper showed a strong effect of 
deworming on worm infection rates in a district in Kenya, which reflected not only direct effects 
on children receiving the drugs but also surprisingly strong externalities to others in the same 
school or nearby schools. Bleakley 2007 also noted the strong and immediate effects of the 
Rockefeller deworming campaign in the American South. 
Another area where REs point to success is in preventing or treating infant diarrhea 
(Zwane and Kremer 2007). Breastfeeding, immunization against diarrheal diseases, micronutrient 
supplementation and oral rehydration therapy (ORT) have all been found to work in randomized 
trails in the fight against diarrhea. Unlike the education interventions, we know from case studies 
that these interventions were pursued by donors. Case studies suggest ORT is another health aid 
success story, accounting for a substantial drop in diarrheal mortality since 1980. REs seem to be 
more persuasive in health, but for reasons that also make them less necessary. The link between 
medicines and health is often so obvious that it doesn’t require an RE to verify it.  Still to be as 
generous as possible, taken together, the various kinds of evidence support some positive effect of 
aid on health. 
 
 
   57
2.  Approaches to improving health through foreign aid 
1.  Horizontal vs. vertical 
Despite this success, there are huge health problems in Africa that aid agencies are still 
trying to solve. There has been throughout the history of foreign aid a tension between two 
alternative approaches to health.  The “vertical” approach focuses on one disease at a time, 
marshalling a top-down mass campaign against the disease through targeted prevention measures, 
vaccination if applicable, and medicines for treatment.  As just mentioned, it was extraordinarily 
effective in taking the initial strides against the target disease.  However, the vertical programs 
were not sufficient to resolve Africa’s health crisis, because each program eventually reached 
some point of diminishing returns where there remained a segment of the population beyond its 
reach. In some sense, the health aid field has never figured out what to do next after diminishing 
returns to vertical programs set in. Table 6 shows the gaps that still remain in health coverage in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (as well as the average for the comparator group of all low income countries, 
which does not appear to be significantly different). There is a good news/bad news character of 
this table -- coverage rates of 70-80 percent are reached in immunization and nutritional 
supplements, which is considerable progress compared to zero, but one still wonders why 20-30 
percent of all African children fail to receive such well-known cheap and easy remedies for life-
threatening conditions (such as our 70-year-old standby from Table 5, Vitamin A). 
Table 6: Most recent health indicators for Africa compared to all low income countries 
  Africa 
Low 
Income 
Acute Respiratory Infection treatment (% of children under 5 taken to a health 
provider)*  43 44
Children with fever receiving antimalarial drugs (% of children under age 5 with 
fever)**  38 23
Diarrhea treatment (% of children under 5 with diarrhea receiving oral rehydration 
and continued feeding)*  38 40
Immunization, Diptheria/Pertussis/Tetanus (% of children ages 12-23 months)**  71 67
Immunization, Measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)**  69 67
Vitamin A supplementation coverage rate (% of children ages 6-59 months)**  79 76
*median of all countries with data for 2000-2006 
**regional or income group average provided by World Development Indicators for 2005   58
 
The “horizontal” approach focused on making the health system work well to administer 
prevention and treatment to patients rather than diseases, whatever the patient’s disease may be. 
Horizontal advocates criticize the vertical programs for ignoring implementation problems with 
health projects in general, and for potentially crowding out less costly treatment for more 
widespread illnesses with more costly treatment for less common diseases. Defenders of the 
vertical programs can point to many of the health successes mentioned above; horizontal critics of 
vertical programs point to their severe diminishing returns, namely the continuation of high 
mortality rates in Africa from preventable and treatable diseases and the health gaps shown 
above.  
The history of health aid is a cycling between these two alternatives. After the early 
“vertical” health successes described above ran into diminishing returns, there was a switch to the 
“horizontal” approach. By 1980, the World Bank had shifted towards recommending an 
“integrated approach” in health (i.e. horizontal), which continued for the next two decades. The 
1993 World Bank WDR on health, for example, stressed the health system problems described 
above as a critical bottleneck in improving health.  
By the new millennium, however, the prominent health crisis of AIDS in Africa induced 
a shift back towards vertical, disease-specific programs, such as the creation of the Global Fund 
to fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GFATM) in 2002, the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003, the President’s Malaria Initiative (PMI) in 2005, and the Gates 
Foundation’s well-publicized efforts on these same diseases, which implied large increases in 
health aid but mainly in these vertical programs. There have been some successes from these 
programs, such as the life-saving treatment of more than 1 million HIV positive Africans (Sachs 
2008).  However, critics have complained that the concentration of foreign aid on AIDS, in 
particular, has crowded out more cost-effective approaches to more common diseases, not least 
because the AIDS initiatives may have overwhelmed the still dysfunctional public health systems.   59
For example, a group of health experts wrote in the prestigious medical journal the Lancet in July 
2003 about how 5.5 million child deaths could have been prevented in 2003, lamenting that 
“child survival has lost its focus.” They blamed in part the “levels of attention and effort directed 
at preventing the small proportion of child deaths due to AIDS with a new, complex, and 
expensive intervention.” (Gareth Jones et al. 2003)  England (2008) points out that while AIDS 
causes 3.7 percent of mortality, it gets 25 percent of international healthcare aid. Even within 
AIDS programs, prevention is neglected relative to treatment, even though the former has far 
better cost/benefit ratios (Canning 2006). Moreover, AIDS funding is increasing even further – 
President George W. Bush signed a bill in July 2008 giving an extension of his original 2003 
five-year $15 billion PEPFAR program for another five years at $30 billion (still heavily skewed 
towards treatment). AIDS is a good example of how the vertical approach is vulnerable to capture 
by lobbies for particular diseases that are “fashionable” causes in rich countries but don’t 
necessarily match the aid recipient’s priorities. 
The World Bank (2007) responded by again fervently advocating the horizontal 
approach. The large new vertical programs would not work unless there was an “urgent effort … 
made to strengthen health systems” (p. 15). But the G8 Summit in July 2008 in its discussion of 
health in Africa stubbornly stuck with vertical: “G8 members are determined to honor in full their 
specific commitments to fight infectious diseases, namely malaria, tuberculosis, polio and 
working towards the goal of universal access to HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care by 
2010.”
32
 The cycling between vertical and horizontal approaches could be another example of 
inability to learn characteristic of the transformational approaches in foreign aid to Africa. There 
were both vertical and horizontal advocates who hoped for “transformational” results. The 
                                                 
32 2008 G8 Summit Declaration, Development and Africa, July 8, 2008 
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rhetoric of vertical programs often implied absolute and improbable goals without regards to cost-
benefit analysis, such as wiping out a disease altogether (such as malaria) or providing universal 
access to treatment for that disease (such as AIDS). For its part, the unrealistic ambition of the 
horizontal approach is similar to that of “capacity-building” discussed above – changing the 
health civil service is no easier than changing the rest of the civil service.  
2.  User fees in health 
Another long-standing debate in health is whether to charge patients user fees for health 
services. The World Bank orthodoxy in the structural adjustment era of the 1980s and 1990s was 
that user fees in health (as in other sectors) were desirable, since they avoided subsidization of 
wealthy patients and allowed programs to collect more revenue and reach more beneficiaries. The 
World Bank retreated from this position under attack in the late 1990s from NGOs who found the 
idea of charging for life-saving services morally offensive.  
The debate shifted in the new millennium towards a pragmatic and evidence-based debate 
about whether user fees were successful in screening out people who did not value the health 
service, may have had an additional behavioral effect on patients actually using the health input 
(through the sunk cost effect documented in behavorial studies), and/or the fees may have 
allowed the health service to reward distributors for making sure the inputs were available to 
patients. On the other side, there was a good public economics argument for subsidizing health 
inputs that had major external effects, such as prevention and treatment for infectious diseases.  
This is the kind of debate where the RE literature claims to deliver a clearer message to 
policymakers and does not allow them to cherry-pick studies for support for their favorite policies 
or interventions. It is also supposed to deliver a clearer verdict than the sometimes inconclusive 
debates between academics about empirical findings. Unfortunately, things did not work out so 
cleanly, as pointed out by Rodrik (2008) and others. For example, advocates of providing 
development goods for free often quote the Cohen and Dupas (2007) study that finds that going 
from free provision of bed nets to charging 75 cents per net (still heavily subsidized) reduced   61
uptake by 75 percent. Supporters of charging for development goods have cited the Ashraf et al 
2007 finding that charging for water purification tablets was successful in screening out those less 
likely to use them.  
The general conclusion that demand for health inputs is very sensitive to price in Africa 
seems on firmer ground. Kremer and Miguel 2007 found that modest user fees for deworming 
drugs reduced take-up rates by 80 percent in Kenya. Kremer and Holla 2008 argue that the 
pattern of take-up being very sensitive to price is consistent with a number of RCT studies of 
interventions: not only deworming and bed nets, but also learning the results of HIV tests. They 
point out that the evidence from Progresa of significant health, nutrition, and education responses 
to relatively small subsidies is also consistent with the same high price elasticity hypothesis. Even 
the Ashraf et al. 2007 study did show a high price elasticity for water purification tablets (even if 
price is successful at screening out those less likely to use them, there remains the question of 
why there are so many who don’t want to use water purification tablets). This is also an area 
where RE studies are likely to be more productive since they focus on behavioral parameters like 
the price elasticity of demand, as opposed to the average response to a seemingly random list of 
development interventions that could generate many different behavioral responses. 
The REs were useful in that they focused research on a new puzzle: what explains what 
seem to be irrationally high price elasticities in health? The first explanation is from behavioral 
economics, emphasized by Kremer and Holla 2008, where irrational responses to the availability 
of relatively cheap life-saving treatment can be changed by a “nudge” in the right direction. The 
second possibility, as Kremer and Miguel 2004 discuss, is that this extreme sensitivity to price 
may reflect the local state of knowledge about health, in which disease is viewed through the lens 
of traditional cultural beliefs and little value is placed on modern scientific medicine. If this 
second explanation is true, then the high price elasticity is not good news for cost-sharing 
programs, but the news is not so good for free provision either, since modern medicine will be 
heavily under-utilized even if it is free (especially considering it is not really free when getting   62
and administering medicine is time-consuming). There have long been anecdotes about malaria 
bed nets being used as wedding veils and fishing nets, for example; Minakawa et al 2008 give 
more systematic evidence of free insecticide-treated bed nets donated by an NGO in Western 
Kenya on Lake Victoria being diverted to uses such as drying fish and fishing nets.   Given the 
drastically different implications of the behavioral versus health knowledge explanations, the 
literature needs even more discussion and testing of them.  
iii.  Water and sanitation infrastructure 
I use water and sanitation as an example of aid’s approach to financing infrastructure, 
since in this sector we have a clear welfare indicator linked to aid-financed infrastructure projects.  
1.  Trends on water and sanitation indicators 
The trends on water and sanitation in Africa are similar to those of the other social indicators. 
There has been success in increasing the percent of Africans with access to clean water, as in 
other developing countries.
33 This could suggest some success of aid-financed water projects, or 
it could be consistent with a worldwide tendency for improvement in access to clean water in 
poor countries unrelated to amount of aid received in each country. Again, it is informative to 
review stylized facts but they fall well short of the kind of detailed attribution evidence that 
would make it possible to evaluate aid agencies’ efforts. 
                                                 
33 The definition of “clean water” is unfortunately rather fuzzy. While “clean water” is used as an easily 
recognizable shorthand, the data actually refer to “percent with access to an improved water source.” The 
degree of improvement could fall short of producing what the reader might think of as “clean” water. These 
ambiguities contribute to the weak data situation on this indicator, where comparability over time and other 
sources of noise are more problematic than with other social indicators (not to imply the data are so good 
on the others either).   63
Figure 9: Relative Infrastructure Performance in Africa 






































The randomization literature has contributed some insights into the area of clean water 
provision. If the goal of clean water provision is to prevent water-borne disease, there may be 
smaller-scale programs that are more cost-effective under some circumstances than the 
infrastructure traditionally favored by donors -- large scale distribution systems with water pipes 
or massive efforts to sink boreholes. 
REs identified some smaller-scale programs that have strong effects on clean water 
provision. As already noted, Ashraf et al. 2007 noted that water purification tablets in Lusaka, 
Zambia were an inexpensive way of avoiding water-borne illness. Zwane and Kremer 2007 
suggest behavioral changes such as hand-washing and disinfecting the household’s own water 
were more effective in rural areas than formal infrastructure. Hand-washing and other hygiene 
behaviors may be necessary even if there is clean water infrastructure, to avoid re-contaminating 
the water, although evidence on this is ambiguous (Kremer and Zwane 2007). However, how to   64
induce such behavior change is still unclear. Kremer et al. 2008 showed that investments in 
protecting naturally occurring springs from contamination  led to dramatic improvements in water 
quality in rural Kenya (as measured by the fecal indicator E. Coli). However, the higher 
communal water quality at the springs did not seem to pay off at the household level, perhaps 
because of recontamination through household behavior, as there was no effect on diarrhea, or 
child height and weight. We have already seen that there was high price elasticity for water 
purification tablets, and Zwane and Kremer describe how behavior changes such as hand-washing 
and purifying water were surprisingly difficult to achieve in poor households. Another study by 
Kremer et al. 2008 in rural Kenya estimated household willingness to pay for clean water 
(estimated through transportation costs to protected springs that were clean compared to those 
that were not) as coming out only to $0.86-$1.72 per case of diarrhea avoided (surprisingly low 
when diarrhea from water-borne diseases is a life-threatening condition for infants.) As in the 
health area, there could be lack of knowledge among the poor of the scientific mechanisms that 
make clean water desirable. This anomaly is again perhaps the most interesting result from the 
RE literature on clean water, pointing to a new area where researchers and aid workers could 
search for solutions which may not have been so compelling without these RE studies. 
2.  Changing fashions in infrastructure aid 
In the early days of aid, the emphasis in infrastructure aid was simply on increasing the 
quantity of physical infrastructure. By the time of the 1994 World Bank WDR on infrastructure, 
the emphasis had changed to emphasize problems like inadequate maintenance and allocation of 
scarce funds to “white elephants.” Despite this change in emphasis, there has not been much 
progress on improving maintenance, as described earlier. On “white elephants,” the Bank has 
used its Public Expenditure Reviews as its traditional tool to redirect aid away from unproductive 
boondoggles towards productive infrastructure. The problem of fungibility has meant that cutting 
off aid financing to a particular project does not necessarily succeed in killing the project, since 
the government can turn to other donors or use its own funds (famous white elephants include the   65
new national capitals built in Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria, the state-owned $5 billion Ajaokuta steel 
mill in Nigeria begun in 1979 that has yet to produce a bar of steel, and the building of an 
international aiport in Eldoret, Kenya – the hometown of Kenya’s long-time autocrat Daniel Arap 
Moi). The white elephant problem has probably become worse because of the influx of aid from 
China into Africa, much of it directed to infrastructure and with even fewer restrictions on 
allocation of spending.   
Recently, the focus on quantity of infrastructure spending has returned, with advocates of 
an increase in aid justifying it in part by the need to pay for better infrastructure for Africa (UN 
Millennium Project 2005, Blair Commission 2005, Sachs 2005, 2008, Collier 2007). The Blair 
Commission 2005, for example, said that Africa needed $10-$20 billion a year in additional 
Western aid for its infrastructure quantity needs (p. 49).
34 The World Bank web site on clean 
water stressed quantity of funds and investment in 2008: 
Finding new sources of finance will be critical to expanding access to urban water supply and sanitation 
(WSS). Present investment towards the WSS Millenium Development Goals is only half what is needed, 
and all sources of investment finance for the sector have been declining.
35
 
The return to emphasizing infrastructure quantity does not seem to acknowledge the 
micro empirical research cited above. The quantity emphasis also seems to disregard common 
sense principles of cost-benefit analysis in favor of opaque calculations of “what is needed.” The 
recent micro empirical literature also emphasizes the chronic and seemingly insoluble 
maintenance problems, like those mentioned above -- a third of all South Asian water 
infrastructure and half of all boreholes in Western Kenya were found to be not functional in 
recent reports. New fads such as community-based maintenance schemes have little evidence to 
support their effectiveness. Obviously, inability to solve the maintenance problem sharply lowers 
the payoff to quantity of physical infrastructure (Zwane and Kremer 2007). Low tech solutions 
like those discussed above (hand washing, water purification tablets, spring protection) are 
                                                 
34 Although the Commission did suggest avoiding white elephants. 
35 http://go.worldbank.org/R62P1EEJD0, accessed on August 1, 2008   66
accordingly even more attractive if the behavioral changes could be achieved. In this area, the RE 
results were useful because they were intuitive, suggested new problems to solve, and questioned 
an aid agency bias towards financing physical infrastructure that was not based on evidence.  
Another cycle with infrastructure (like in health) was that between free public provision, 
public provision with user fees, and private provision. In infrastructure, free public provision had 
been the default assumption in the beginning of foreign aid. The World Bank (and to some extent 
the IMF) began to point after 1980 to the advantages of user fees in having non-poor users of 
public services help raise revenue for these goods (which could then be used to subsidize the 
poor). About the same time, the potential role of the private sector began to seem more promising 
and there were privatizations of public utilities like water and electricity (and there was also 
gradually growing awareness that the private sector played an important role in providing health 
and education despite the existence of public services). All of this was sharply reversed after the 
late 1990s under pressure from NGO critics and globalization protesters who were scandalized 
that anybody should have to pay for basic necessities like water. Hence, the cycle has swung back 
to free or heavily subsidized public provision in infrastructure. This is an unfortunate triumph of 
demagogic rhetoric over evidence, since both case studies and rigorous micro studies show 
positive results from privatization of some utilities. For example, the privatization of water 
services in Argentina was associated with a 5 to 7 percent drop in infant mortality in Argentina 
according to one recent study (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005)).  
e.  Agriculture 
  Agriculture is an area that has long attracted attention from those who want to 
help Africa (see the quotes from Lord Hailey 1938 above). The success of the “green revolution” 
in Asia in the 1970s was tantalizing to aid donors, who hoped for similar results in Africa.  Yet 
African agricultural aid is also unusual in that virtually all those involved agree that it has been a 
failure, amidst much recrimination and finger-pointing. The stylized facts on food production per   67
capita certainly influence this pessimism, with a decline in Africa contrasting with the general 
Asian rise (Figure 10).
36 Of course, there are the same problems with negative outcomes as with 
positive outcomes, that it is hard to resolve attribution of outcomes to aid vis-à-vis other factors 
such as policies followed by African governments, world market conditions, climate, etc. 
Figure 10: Failure of food production in Africa relative to Green Revolution in Asia 































































































Eicher and Baker (1982) noted a quarter century ago that Africa was the only region that 
experienced declining food production per capita over the preceding two decades, a situation they 
labeled “Africa’s food crisis.” Soil fertility, erosion, and deforestation continue to be problems, 
although some technical solutions have been known for at least 70 years (Table 5 on the 1938 
Hailey Report again.) Periodic World Bank task forces tried to remedy the situation. World Bank 
(1997) called for movement “From Vision to Action.” World Bank (2003) is the report of another 
task force called “Reaching the Rural Poor,” which noted 
                                                 
36 One exception to the general gloom on African agriculture was the success of commercial maize 
production in southern Africa.   68
the agricultural development portfolio has not yet met the 80% satisfactory development outcome 
rating at completion, as targeted by “From Vision to Action.” The quality of the poverty focus, 
and the sustainability and quality of the institutional development still leave much to be desired. 
Reaching the Rural Poor will address these concerns. 
 
The latest report, an internal evaluation of all World Bank work in agriculture over the 
period 1991-2006 (World Bank Independent Evaluation Group 2008), was again scathing about 
failure. The 2008 World Bank WDR (p. 15) in turn noted the stagnant cereal yields in Africa in 
contrast to rising yields in all other regions.
37 WDR 2008 noted the existence of 
“’agroskepticism’ of many donors” which “may well be related to their experience with past 
unsuccessful interventions in agriculture.” Similarly Eicher and Kane (2004) noted “The failure 
of past initiatives in agriculture led to a reduced confidence among donors in agriculture in the 
1980s …and many donors have since turned to other sectors.”  
The UN system has followed a similar progression, with a World Food Summit in 1996 
another installment in a long line of efforts to make progress on hunger in Africa through 
agricultural development. The FAO (2006) passed judgment on that effort: “Ten years later, we 
are confronted with the sad reality that virtually no progress has been made towards that 
objective.”  
As far as the “green revolution” specifically, Eicher (1999) had already noted that: 
Much energy has also been wasted in trying to replicate Asia’s Green Revolution model 
in Africa before the completion of pilot studies. Over the past decade, many instant experts on 
Africa have talked glibly about the ease of replicating Asia’s Green Revolution model in Africa. 
Many of these experts have overlooked Africa’s early stage of scientific development, falsely 
assuming that Africa had the requisite infrastructure, irrigated land, trained scientists, technology, 
and national and local institutions to replicate the Asian model. 
 
The Wapenhans report (World Bank 1992) confirmed this picture, with only 40 percent 
of World Bank agriculture projects in Africa judged as successful (compared to 59 percent for all 
projects in Africa, and 72 percent for African education projects).  
                                                 
37 Incentives to increase yields per hectare may be weaker in Africa than in other regions because of it 
greater land/population ratios.   69
The attempt to jump-start African agriculture has involved many different interventions 
from subsidized fertilizer and heavy investment in agricultural R&D and extension services in the 
1960s to “integrated rural development” (an attempt to deal with all the complementary inputs at 
once)  in the 1970s, to a shift away from public support for farmers towards market forces in the 
1980s and 1990s with “structural adjustment,” to renewed interest in the new millennium in more 
agricultural R&D (again) and fixing “market failures” (again) in inputs such as fertilizer and 
improved seeds (the cyclical nature of aid ideas is again evident). 
The pattern of actual aid to African agriculture has followed the Bank’s “agro-
skepticism” description, with a sharply falling share in total aid to Africa (with the winner 
appearing to be the social sectors whose share has risen sharply). Agricultural scholars have 
severely criticized donors like the World Bank and USAID for the diminished attention to 
agriculture in Africa, and have blamed international NGOs for lobbying for special causes (most 
of which imply more social spending in aid); these criticisms gained traction with the current 
world food crisis.    
A more positive spin on the changing sectoral shares of aid is that the aid agencies were 
responding appropriately to areas of relative success and failure. We have seen that there is more 
ground for seeing some success in the social sectors, so the reallocation of aid to social sectors 
from the failing agricultural aid sector could be seen as a constructive move to maximize returns 
from aid.    70
Figure 11: The shift out of agricultural aid into social sector aid 

































  However, neglect of any high profile problem like African agriculture sooner or later 
results in countervailing pressures, so aid agencies and private foundations are now making 
renewed efforts to treat the ills of African agriculture.  Reports from the UN Millennium 
Commission and Blair Commission on Africa in 2005, not to mention the World Bank’s 2008 
WDR on agriculture, put a lot of stress on solving problems of African agriculture. The Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation (2006) recently announced a “Green Revolution” initiative towards 
that end. The crisis of sharply rising food prices in 2008 put even more pressure on donors to 
restart old agricultural development programs. International summits are again a preferred vehicle 
for action, despite their ineffectual track record. At another World Food Summit sponsored by the 
FAO in response to the food crisis of 2008, donor agencies and 180 governments said in their 
joint statement “We reaffirm the conclusions of the World Food Summit in 1996.”
38  The G-8 
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Summit in July 2008 said “we will reverse the overall decline of aid and investment in the 
agricultural sector” in Africa, as well as “promote more agricultural research and development,” 
and a “Green Revolution.”
39 The recycling of failed ideas in the transformational approaches is 
very stark in African agriculture. 
  In contrast, RE studies have shed light on some of the marginal steps that could pay off in 
agriculture. One problem that is being studied is the chronically low use of fertilizer by African 
farmers, compared to other regions. Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2008 study the hypothesis that 
the return to fertilizer on real world maize farms in Kenya is lower than the high returns on pilot 
farms, using REs of actual farms at different dosages of fertilizer. They found high returns also on 
real farms, although it required a kind of Goldilocks conclusion – too little or too much fertilizer 
makes the return unfavorable, but using just the right amount yields a large positive return. The 
official Kenyan government recommendation is NOT at the right amount and would yield poor 
returns. These results could suggest the problem with fertilizer under-utilization is due to missing 
technical knowledge on how much fertilizer to apply, but this is puzzling given the high private 
returns to acquiring such knowledge.  In contrast, Conley and Udry 2007 document farmers 
learning how much fertilizer to apply from their successful neighbors in a new technology, 
pineapple growing, in Ghana (using spatial econometric techniques on a unique dataset of social 
connections among farmers). 
An earlier study by Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson 2007 tests for behavioral explanations 
of low fertilizer use. They find what seems to be a savings commitment problem – farmers do not 
set aside money for fertilizer for the next season when they are flush with funds from the harvest 
in the current season. Selling a voucher earmarked for fertilizer purchases to the farmers right 
after the harvest seems to correct the problem. These two RE studies are notable for shedding 
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light on behavioral models of farmers’ fertilizer use, again in contrast to the frequent complaint 
about RE studies that they are not well-connected to good behavioral models. There is still the 
tension between irrational behavior explanations of low fertilizer use and the missing knowledge 
explanation, similar to the rival hypotheses we saw above in health. REs have usefully provided 
some evidence to make both viable candidates, but more research is required to distinguish 
between the two hypotheses with such different policy implications. 
  Other micro studies (not REs) also show some potential in tackling some of the chronic 
problems of agriculture one at a time. A common concern about aid and agriculture is that food 
aid – giving food in kind for free – could harm local agriculture by driving down producer prices. 
If the poor are disproportionately small farmers, the longstanding fear in aid policy circles was 
that this kind of aid would perversely hurt the poor. Levinsohn and McMillan 2007 address this 
concern by analyzing a dataset with tens of thousands of household in Ethiopia, one of the 
chronic recipients of food aid. They find that the poor are disproportionately likely to be net 
buyers of wheat, and buyers outnumber sellers at all levels of income. Hence, the food aid fears 
are misplaced at least in Ethiopia – food aid is helping more households than it is hurting, and 
even more so among the poorest households.  However, they note that the same objectives could 
be attained and local farmers also benefited if food were purchased locally and then distributed to 
the poor. This has been a frequent recommendation of aid analysts and there has been some 
movement in that direction, but there is still considerable pressure to source food purchases from 
the donor economies because of rich country agricultural lobbies. 
f.  Conclusions on Project interventions 
The project record on aid is mixed, with some suggestive evidence of success in social 
sectors, and nearly universal agreement on failure in agriculture. Micro evidence is also 
consistent with success of project interventions, at least in social sectors. RE studies shed some 
light on some of these interventions, even if not as much as their proponents promised. This 
picture suggests that the marginal approach to fix one problem at a time or to assist individual   73
Africans to get better health and education has a suggestive track record of success, as well as 
indications of future potential.  
 If this picture is accurate, an important research question that I cannot resolve here is why 
the results were so poor in agriculture compared to social sectors. I can’t resist throwing out some 
suggestive hypotheses however: Perhaps the different types of problems in different sectors led to 
the application of the marginal approach in social sectors and the transformational approach in 
agriculture .The marginal approach was more feasible in social sectors because the easier 
attribution of observable success or failure in individual social sector projects compared to 
agriculture made it more feasible to monitor aid agencies in the social sector, strengthening 
incentives for good performance and inducing a resort to marginal approaches in some areas.  
A related idea by Pritchett and Woolcock 2004 is that government services (and aid) 
perform the worst in areas that are both transaction-intensive and discretionary. So for example, 
vaccination programs worked fairly well because they were not discretionary (even though they 
were transaction intensive), because the implementing agents were performing a routine action. 
Similarly, a massive school-building program to raise enrollment was transaction-intensive but 
not discretionary – the same school blueprint could be built everywhere. Agricultural extension, 
on the other hand, is both discretionary and transaction-intensive. The extension agent must deal 
with each individual farmer, and each farmer’s problems are different, precluding a routine 
response. It was thus extremely difficult to monitor extension agent’s performance, and incentives 
for good performance were weaker. The same logic could explain the areas of relative failure 
within health. The inability to make much project on strengthening health systems could be 
related to how highly discretionary and transaction-intensive are health systems. In terms of this 
paper, aid agencies are more likely to resort to transformational approaches in areas (or 
combinations of areas) that are both discretionary and transaction-intensive. The agencies will be 
rewarded for “big efforts” in these areas but it will not be feasible to assess the impact of aid 
agency actions (so that the transformational approach will persist whether it works or not).   74
The RE literature also can more readily assess payoff when it studies routine actions in aid 
– administering deworming drugs, conditional cash transfers, ORT, etc. -- rather than 
discretionary actions, like agricultural extension. This hints at the probability that the RE 
literature is addressing the areas where aid was already working the best. REs can study 
incentives for teachers to show up to class, but not how well the teachers are doing the 
discretionary, transaction-intensive job of helping their students learn. 
Another contentious issue on projects is how do you define “success”? This again reflects 
the tension between the marginal and the transformational view of Western aid. If success is 
defined as improving the well-being of a significant number of poor individuals, the project 
evidence is suggestive that there have been achievements on this score in Africa. If success is 
defined as improving the “Factor X’s” in such a strong fashion as to lift Africa out of poverty into 
steady growth towards prosperity, i.e. to “save Africa,” then the record is not so encouraging. The 
aid agencies seemed to have the transformational definition of success in mind by the late 1970s, 
since disappointment with project interventions led them to engage in attempts to induce more 
systemic changes in African countries, beginning in the 1980s, as we will see now in the next 
section.  
B.  The Beginning of Systemic interventions: Structural Adjustment 
The disappointment with the apparently low growth payoff to project aid to Africa led the 
Western aid policymakers to get ever more ambitious, with attempted interventions in remaking 
the economic, political, and social system in Africa. The disappointing results on growth made 
more compelling the general equilibrium argument that it does little good to get an individual 
project working when overall systemic incentives for growth and development are very negative. 
For example, the designer of the Progresa program, Santiago Levy (2008), is pessimistic about 
the long run results of PROGRESA for its beneficiaries, because there would only be low-
productivity informal sector jobs for them due to Mexico’s policy-induced labor market 
distortions. Similar conclusions could be drawn about any health or education intervention when   75
the economy does not create opportunities even for those with higher human capital thanks to the 
intervention. There was also positive inspiration from the success of the Gang of Four (Hong 
Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan), where aid agencies gave credit for success to outward-
oriented economy-wide policies. The targets for interventions began with economic policies, then 
institutions, and finally fixing failed states and resolving civil wars.  
The arguments for systemic approaches were plausible and the movement from one target 
to the next could have reflected learning. Moreover, there definitely was some learning in the 
literature on determinants of development, such as the increased dismissal of mechanical models 
in favor of awareness of incentives created by first, economic policies and second, institutions.  
However, this development learning did not necessarily pay off in aid practice, as stylized facts 
and some of the more well-executed aggregate econometric studies (even if identification was a 
little shaky, as noted earlier) led to disappointment with each successive systemic approach 
among both academics and aid officials. Yet escalation continued anyway, consistent with an 
adherence of aid agencies to the transformational view. 
a.  Record on structural adjustment 
Structural adjustment loans (SALs) were created in 1980 by the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank. These were loans whose funds disbursed rapidly, conditional on the 
recipient “adjusting” their economic (“structural”) policies. In Africa, the conditions came to 
focus on correcting a number of distortions that were prevalent in Africa: (1) artificial official 
exchange rates that implied real overvaluation of the domestic currency and, (2) foreign exchange 
controls that led to a high black market premium on foreign currency given the artificial exchange 
rate in (1), (3) controls on interest rates that led to negative real interest rates,  (4) restrictive 
tariffs and quotas that gave very high protection to domestic firms and/or led to consumer goods 
rationing, (5) prevalence of inefficient state enterprises that required government subsidies and 
delivered few benefits for the economy, (6) high budget and current account deficits. Correction 
of these distortions implied devaluation, liberalization, fiscal austerity, and privatization, a   76
combination that became known in developing country policymaking as the “Washington 
Consensus” (a term coined by John Williamson). The argument for policy changes to supplement 
the project approach became stronger with a famous result shown by the 1991 World 
Development Report of the World Bank (1991), that rates of returns to projects were lower with 
bad policies (specifically, high trade restrictions, high foreign exchange premiums, and high 
fiscal deficits) compared to good policies (low values of the above). This result was eventually 
published as Isham and Kaufmann (1999). 
However, the poor growth outcomes in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s caused much 
blame to be heaped on structural adjustment. The attempt to attain East Asia’s growth (or even 
respectable per capita growth) did not succeed, not only in Africa but also in Latin America and 
the Middle East. With this failure, the “imitate the stars” approach fell into disrepute with many 
academic observers, such as Dixit (2007): 
At any time, some country is doing well, and academic as well as practical observers are tempted to 
generalize from its choices and recommend the same to all countries. After a decade or two, this country 
ceases to do so well, some other country using some other policies starts to do well, and becomes the new 
star that all countries are supposed to follow. 
 
 Hence, the backlash against structural adjustment coincided with a loss of confidence in 
the academic literature that researchers could identify policy actions that would raise growth. The 
early hope that growth regressions would identify growth-promoting policies ran afoul of 
concerns about data mining (see discussion above). So many of the world’s leading 
macroeconomists concluded in a conference called the Barcelona Development Agenda (2004): 
“there is no single set of policies that can be guaranteed to ignite sustained growth.”
40 The World 
Bank (2005) itself accepted this agnosticism: “different policies can yield the same result, and the 
same policy can yield different results.” The World Bank followed this up by sponsoring a 
Growth Commission, whose final report appeared in May 2008, and contained a similarly 
agnostic conclusion: “It is hard to know how the economy will respond to a policy, and the right 
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answer in the present moment may not apply in the future” (Commission on Growth and 
Development 2008, p. 29). This is not to say that these cited reports embraced development 
nihilism – they all contain plenty of useful insights about development – but the confidence of the 
SAL era that economists can say what policies will reliably pay off in growth rates is gone. 
The controversy over SALs following the growth disappointments became so intense, 
involving both academic economists and NGO advocates (the latter concerned about the effect of 
fiscal austerity on social spending), that the IMF and World Bank retreated. In the new 
millennium, there was at the very least a renaming of the controversial SALs, and perhaps some 
change in policy, to Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities in the IMF, and Poverty Reduction 
Support Credits in the World Bank.  
a.  Effect on policies 
What actually happened on macroeconomic policy reform in Africa after the introduction of 
SALs, and how and why did it happen? 
The literature’s take on the effect of SALs on policies seems at first blush contradictory: 
(1) SALs were ineffective at changing economic policies, and (2) economic policies improved in 
Africa during the era of structural adjustment and afterwards. The resolution of the apparent 
contradiction is simply that there is a lot of variation within Africa as to who received SALs, and 
this variation was unrelated to the improvement in policies. 
The variation consists of whether countries received SALs at all, and for those who did, 
how many they received. The biggest surprise in the way that SALs evolved was that many 
countries received an awful lot of them, topped by the 26 in Cote d’Ivoire over 1980-1999. There 
are two different ways to interpret the frequent repetition of adjustment lending to the same 
country: (1) policy dysfunction requires a gradual, multi-stage treatment, so each additional SAL 
was taking a salutary step in the right direction, or (2) previous SALs were ineffective at 
changing policies (or raising growth, to be discussed below), so new SALs tried again, which also   78
helped repay the previous ineffective SALs. In the view according to (2), over time a serious 
problem of moral hazard in adjustment lending developed. 
The evidence seems inconsistent with (1), since Easterly (2005) found no evidence of 
policy improvements from one SAL to the next within countries. Collier et al. 1997 also pointed 
out the lack of evidence that SAL conditions were kept.  World Bank 1998 (p. 51) pointed out 
that the same agricultural policy reform in Kenya was the subject of a condition in five different 
SALs, violated each time. The IMF’s own evaluation office (Independent Evaluation Office 
(IEO) 2002) harshly criticized the IMF’s repeat lending as counterproductive, apparently finding 
no evidence that it was part of a salutary multi-step process. The IEO 2007 confirmed the general 
failure of IMF SALs to change economic policies over 1995-2004 (a period including the 
successor instrument to SALs after 1999).  IEO 2007 found that about half of structural 
conditions were not kept. 
Yet Easterly 2005 found an exogenous trend in improvement in most of the policies 
described above, unrelated to the number of SALs received. It could be that the intellectual 
influence of the IMF and World Bank was important in convincing countries to improve their 
policies, but if so, this was not mediated through SALs.  
Why were SALs ineffective at inducing policy change? Svensson (2003) argues that there 
was a problem of time inconsistency in conditionality. Since aid recipients knew that each 
country department in the World Bank, for example, was under pressure ex-post to fully disburse 
its budget, the threat of withholding disbursements if conditions were unmet was not credible ex-
ante.
41 The donors also seemed to lack appreciation for internal political incentives to sometimes 
keep pursuing policies that benefited local elites. The weak incentives to change from donor 
conditions paled by comparison. 
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Even though the evidence is against SALs as an inducement to change, African 
governments did indeed correct some major distortions during the era of structural adjustment, 
consistent with the exogenous improvement orthogonal to SALs. Some of the worse distortions 
were the overvalued exchange rates. According to one estimate, the median African currency was 
82 percent overvalued in PPP terms in 1980.
42 Over 1980-2001, there was a steady trend towards 
real devaluation (including a major devaluation of the French-supervised CFA Franc for most 
francophone countries in 1994), so that by the early 1990s, the currency in the median African 
country was at PPP parity, or even undervalued. The devaluation of the official exchange rate 
also sharply reduced the high black market premiums on foreign exchange that had previously 
been prevalent in Africa.  
Figure 11: Real Currency Devaluation in Africa 





































































                                                 
42 The measure of the benchmark real overvaluation is based on Dollar (1992), then extrapolated to other 
years with the usual real exchange rate index using domestic and US CPI and nominal exchange rate.   80
  The overall movement towards correcting other distortions is positive but not quite as 
impressive as with the exchange rate. Easterly (2005) defines a country as having a major 
macroeconomic distortion if any of the following hold: inflation is above 40 percent, the black 
market premium is above 40 percent, real overvaluation is more than 40 percent, or the real 
interest is less than -5 percent.  Then the percent of SAL-intensive countries with major 
macroeconomic distortions declined steadily during the structural adjustment period 1980-1999, 
albeit still nearly half at the end.   
b.  Effect on Growth 
  The empirical literature on IMF/World Bank structural adjustment lending and growth 
outcomes faces many of the same issues as the aid and growth literature. There is an obvious 
selection bias in whom the World Bank/IMF treats with adjustment lending, just as there is a 
selection bias in whom an emergency room treats. Some of the complaints by NGOs about SALs 
are based on correlations between SALs and outcomes that are the equivalent of the negative 
correlation between admission to an emergency room and a person’s health, with the implication 
that the emergency room is bad for your health. Przeworski and Vreeland 2000 address this 
problem by doing a selection equation for entering an IMF program involving when a country is 
under pressure from low foreign exchange reserves, high budget deficits, and high debt service. 
Variables affecting the IMF’s side of the loan decision are also significant, such as the balance of 
payments deficit, whether the government is a dictatorship (favorable for getting the IMF to give 
you a loan), and the number of loans the IMF is making to other countries. Controlling for 
selection bias, they find that an IMF program lowers growth by 1.5 percentage points.  
Barro and Lee 2005 find that IMF “loans tend to be larger and more frequent when a 
country has a bigger quota and more professional staff at the IMF and when a country is more 
connected politically and economically to the United States and other major shareholding 
countries of the IMF.” Using these variables as instruments, Barro and Lee find that IMF loans 
have a negative effect on growth. Easterly 2005 does an IV growth regression for the number of   81
World Bank and IMF adjustment loans using as instruments strategic variables like a dummy for 
former French colonies, US military assistance, and log of population size; this regression finds a 
positive but insignificant effect of SALs on growth. Of course, the same concerns about 
identification assumptions (do SALs to Francophone countries have the same effects as others, 
for example?), unclear specifications, and data mining could be leveled against this literature as 
much as the aid and growth literature. This literature differs from the aid literature, however, in 
that there are very few academic claims of positive effects of SALs on growth (although there are 
such claims in non-academic publications of the IMF and World Bank itself).  
   The repetition of the loans to the same country alleviates, but does not eliminate, the 
selection bias problem. If the same patient is re-admitted on a daily basis to the emergency room 
and fails to improve, one is inclined to think the emergency room is ineffective or the wrong form 
of treatment. SALs were supposed to be “emergency” loans that enabled countries to correct 
problems over the life of the original loan – their repetition was not envisioned in their design. It 
could be designers of SALs did not realize that they needed to be a multi-stage process in which 
different loans would address different problems. However, as we have seen, the macroeconomic 
policies did not improve from one loan to the next. 
  Another indirect piece of evidence on the outcomes from SALs is that the loans 
ultimately were forgiven (the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries –HIPC-- initiative in 1996 
partially forgave the SAL debt, then the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative created in 2005 
forgave virtually all of it, which was intended to end over 20 years of incremental debt relief). 
Since SALs to Africa were heavily concessional (zero interest and 40 year maturity), the payoffs 
to the loans were not good enough to avoid a crippling debt crisis even with debt that was mostly 
a grant.
43  Only countries borrowing at the World Bank’s International Development Association 
(IDA) concessional rates were eligible to become HIPCs receiving debt forgiveness (there were 
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41 HIPCs in the end). Of 18 IDA countries that received above average number of SALs, 17 
became HIPCs. Today, debt ratios are rising once again in these same countries – UN (2008, p. x) 
notes that 21 HIPC countries “are considered to be at moderate-to-high risk of falling back into 
debt distress.” The World Bank and IMF do not seem to have learned sufficient lessons about the 
dangers of lending to the poorest countries, with the history of debt forgiveness now creating an 
obvious moral hazard problem.   
C.  Aid,  institutions, and development 
The disappointment with structural adjustment in Africa brought another escalation in 
attempted systemic reform. Under the plausible argument that returns to economic policy reform 
were low if property rights were weak and corrupt autocrats a perpetual threat to the private 
sector, the West shifted emphasis in the 1990s to institutions like corruption, democracy, and 
property rights. This occurred at the same time as the literature increasingly stressed institutions 
as being the fundamental determinant of development (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
2005). Hence, the escalation from policies to institutions made some sense, and once again may 
have reflected some learning in the aid agencies about determinants of development. 
However, this and future escalations also made possible a continual evasion of aid agencies 
for failed reform strategies. As Rodrik (2006) pointed out, the response of aid agencies to the 
failure of previous recommended reforms was to say that they had been “necessary but not 
sufficient,” and make ever longer the list of “necessary” reforms. As Rodrik (2006) also pointed 
out, this makes the hypothesis that the Western-recommended reforms were the right ones almost 
non-falsifiable, since there is always some missing “necessary condition” like “good institutions” 
that can invoked to explain the failure. In the end, however, even this nearly tautological defense 
is unconvincing to those with the “marginal” view – they would point out that no real world 
reform has ever encompassed a nearly infinite list of “necessary reforms,” and so a choice always 
has to be made as to which reforms to include.    83
Moreover, the goal of even transformational reformers was just to get social change started 
along each of these dimensions: social indicators, policies, institutions, and ending civil war and 
state failure (to be discussed below). The idea that a society must have already attained good 
policies, good social indicators, good institutions, good law and order, etc. in order to develop is 
like saying “you must be developed in order to develop.”  Once it is recognized that any reform 
package faces limits on scale and scope, there is hope for actually altering priors as to whether a 
particular package of reforms worked.  
Those with the “marginal” view would also worry about to what extent the more systemic 
features of African societies are really amenable to fixes by outsiders. If even the attempt to 
change economic policies that could be changed by a few technocrats was a big disappointment, 
how much can one hope for outsiders to change more deep-rooted phenomena like corruption, 
democracy, and property rights? The cross country literature gives some useful insights as to the 
deep historical roots of poor institutions in Africa, such as the relative lack of strong pre-colonial 
states (Bockstette et al. 2002, Gennaioli and Rainer 2007),
44 the slave trade (Nunn 2007, 2008), 
ethnic divisions (Easterly and Levine 1997, La Porta et al. 1999), colonial interaction with local 
elites (Mamdani 1996), and artificial borders left behind by colonizers (Alesina et al. 2008). 
Moreover, the cross-section association between good institutions and development gives no 
information on what transitional dynamics of institutions and income are likely or optimal within 
a society over time.  
Finally, such institutions depend not only on top-down legal rules, but also on bottom-up 
social norms and conventions that may have evolved over a very long period (see Easterly 2008b 
for a discussion). Fisman and Miguel (2008) have a clever experiment on the effect of norms by 
showing large differences in unpaid UN parking tickets in Manhattan by national origin, which 
are correlated with corruption outcomes in the home countries. African UN diplomats get a lot of 
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density, which meant that prospective citizens of a prospective state could simply move elsewhere to 
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parking tickets compared with Scandinavians. Formal rules to implement institutions could be 
either a complement or a substitute for social norms. For example, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de 
Silanes, and Shleifer 2008 devise a measure of rules on disclosure of assets by public officials, 
meant to be a tool for controlling corruption. This measure turns out to be negatively correlated 
with polling data averages from countries in the World Values Survey on whether citizens believe 
it is wrong to take a bribe, which is suggestive that the rules are introduced when the social 
sanctions on corruption are not sufficiently strong. 
a.  Corruption 
Corruption used to be an unmentionable word in aid discourse, but that changed in the 1990s, 
which in itself is a sign of some progress. One benchmark turning point was a high profile speech 
condemning corruption that World Bank president James Wolfensohn gave at the 1996 Annual 
Meetings of the Bank and IMF. The aid community had two levers available to try to induce 
decreases in corruption. It could withhold aid from corrupt governments, and it could use its 
technical advice to control corruption. However, using aid money as leverage was subject to the 
same time inconsistency problem as conditions on SALs, and did not turn out to be conspicuously 
effective. In fact, there is no evidence of increasing responsiveness of aid allocation to corruption 
(or to democracy), as demonstrated earlier in Alesina and Weder (2002) and reaffirmed and 
updated in Easterly (2007). 
The second “technical” remedy could be useful if there was a domestic political shift in 
favor of cleaning up corruption, but local actors lacked knowledge of techniques to control 
corruption. However, in practice, aid agencies pushed “anti-corruption strategies” on countries 
almost universally, as if all corruption was a technical problem. The alternative to the “technical” 
view is that corruption is a political economy phenomenon where under some circumstances 
public officials have a particularly strong incentive to favor their private interests rather than the 
public interest (again we see the lack of attention to incentives in the transformational approach, 
in this case political incentives –see Pande (2008) for an articulate treatment). Perhaps the   85
ultimate example of the technical approach was the suggestion by Sachs (2005) that corrupt 
governments should be given more aid money to implement anti-corruption strategies.  At first 
blush, this seems analogous to giving grants to burglars in the hope that they will install alarm 
systems in homes before burgling them. In fairness to Sachs, he probably had in mind some 
incorruptible reformer within the corrupt government, who will get his corrupt colleagues under 
control with a well-financed anti-corruption effort (including such technical fixes as computers on 
which to track government spending). The question remains as to how to identify these 
incorruptible reformers, and the technical approach glosses over the political battle between 
corrupt insiders and anti-corruption reformers that will be determined by many factors besides aid 
and technology.  
i.  Trends on corruption 
There is no trend in corruption in Africa relative to the rest of the world over 1996-2006. This 
conclusion is derived from the measure of Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007 (KKM), who 
do a sophisticated averaging over all available corruption indicators, correcting for selection bias 
and other problems. The KKM measure is relative each year, standardized as a Normal (0,1). 
African countries on average are a little over 0.6 standard deviations worse than the world 
average on corruption, a measure that showed little change over 1996-2006 (especially 
considering the wide confidence intervals). The trend on the relative measure seem most relevant 
to the aid-corruption question when comparing a region above average in aid-intensity to the rest 
of the world in making progress against corruption.    86
Figure 12: Corruption in Africa in International Perspective 

















































































ii.  Empirical evidence on aid and corruption  
What about more formal empirics on the relationship between aid and corruption? One of 
the most well-known regression studies finds that aid worsens corruption for ethnically diverse 
countries – which includes most African countries (Svensson 2000). This finding resonates with 
Banerjee and Pande’s (2007) story that voters that are more polarized along ethnic lines are more 
likely to elect corrupt candidates, because they care more about electing a candidate from their 
ethnic group than electing an honest candidate. Banerjee and Pande showed in the state of Uttar 
Pradesh in India that a rise in ethnic politics went together with increasingly corrupt politicians 
(as measured by voter perceptions – and by the criminal record of the candidate!) Other studies 
find that ethnic diversity (which is the highest in the world in Africa according to standard 
measures) tends to increase the demand for redistribution towards one’s own ethnic group using 
channels like public employment (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 2000) and public transfers (Besley,   87
Pande, and Rao 2004). A related literature shows that less resources are allocated to public goods 
in ethnically diverse environments (see Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999 and Luttmer 2001 for 
the US, Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan 2005 for India, and Miguel and Gugerty 2005 for 
Kenya). Introducing more additional resources such as aid into such a political equilibrium is 
likely to raise misappropriation of public funds.  
Knack 2001 found that aid unconditionally worsened “governance,” an average of ratings 
of corruption, bureaucratic quality, and rule of law. Svensson and Knack instrumented for aid 
with the usual population size, initial need, and strategic variables. However, Tavares 2003 finds 
that aid decreases corruption, using a similar IV specification for aid. It is rather frustrating that 
later authors did not themselves try to relate disparate results to previous studies. Of course, these 
aggregate studies are subject to the same critiques as with the aid and growth literature, with 
unclear specification of other control variables and identifying assumptions that are always 
somewhat problematic for aggregate outcomes in which most factors are endogenous. 
The micro randomization literature has also addressed corruption and possibly points the 
way to more successful marginal aid interventions. One influential study is Olken 2007, who 
found that official audits reduced corruption in Indonesian village road projects. When the 
villagers were told in advance that they would be subject to an audit by the central government 
audit agency (increasing the probability of an audit from 4 to 100 percent), an estimate of 
“missing expenditures” decreased from 28 percent of expenditures to 19 percent. The effect was 
statistically significant, but the magnitude is modest. Olken suggests the probability of 
punishment did not increase anywhere near as dramatically as the probability of an audit. Olken 
also tested whether grassroots monitoring (such as distributing anonymous complaint sheets to 
villagers) decreased corruption, and found no effect. 
Other micro empirical studies (not using randomization) also shed light on the 
effectiveness of some kind of transparency or auditing. In a famous paper, Reinikka and Svensson 
2004 found from a tracking survey that only 13 percent of central government transfers to local   88
primary schools in Uganda arrived at their destination. This research was itself a form of 
transparency, as the release of the study by itself prompted improvement in the transfer ratio. The 
Ugandan central government took the bold measure of publishing the intended transfers by school 
in the local newspapers where they could be monitored by parents and local officials. Reinikka 
and Svensson 2005 showed that the newspaper campaign successfully increased the proportion of 
transfers that arrived at the schools, one of the factors behind an increase in this proportion to 80 
percent. The newspaper campaign also showed up in the increased enrollment and test scores in 
these schools. Also possibly supportive of the monitoring and transparency approach to reducing 
corruption is the finding by Besley, Pande, and Rao 2005 that higher education among the voter 
population is associated with less corruption, using a natural experiment of elections to village 
councils in South India.  
Micro empirics has also found novel ways to document corruption, such as Fisman’s 
(2001) clever study linking Indonesian stock market movements of individual companies to 
fluctuations in the health of the dictator Suharto, implicitly capturing which firms relied on 
connections to Suharto’s network of corruption and patronage. Similar political connections have 
been documented in many other studies covering other countries (see survey in Pande 2008, pp. 
3168-3169). Bertrand, Djankov, Hanna, and Mullainathan 2007 documented costly corruption in 
obtaining drivers’ licenses in India in an experimental setting, where they found that a treatment 
group given a bonus for obtaining a license quickly was more likely than the control group to pay 
bribes and to obtain a license without knowing how to drive!  This latter is an example of the well 
known story that any government regulation creates opportunities for corruption, which has the 
obvious “marginal” recommendation that governments should reduce red tape as much as 
possible. Red tape could also help explain what makes political connections so valuable. 
b.  Democracy 
Aid to promote democracy became fashionable about the same time as aid to combat corruption, 
with democracy promotion linked especially to the end of the Cold War and the early 1990s “end   89
of history” view that the whole world was in transition to democratic capitalism (see Carothers 
1999, 2004 for an extended discussion).   The levers for democracy are the same as those for 
corruption – donors being selective on degree of democracy as an incentive to follow democratic 
practices, and technical advice (how to hold an election, etc.) Again, the outside actors seemed to 
assume an exaggerated sense of their own importance, not recognizing the dependence of 
democracy on many bottom-up social norms and associations not amenable to outside 
manipulation. 
i.  Trends on democratization 
Africa had more of a democratic transition than other developing countries, at about the same 
time (but not quite to the same degree) as ex-Communist countries moved away from autocracy. 
However, Africa’s democratic transition preceded the heyday of democracy promotion efforts by 
donors, so it would be hard to attribute the former to the latter (although general aid may still 
have played some role).  
   90
Figure 13: Democratization in Africa in International Perspective 






















































































































































































































































































The KKM governance indicator on African democracy relative to the rest of the world is 
available only for the decade 1996-2006 (which would correspond more closely to the timing of 
democracy promotion efforts). There has been little sign of Africa converging to the rest of the 
world on the KKM democracy measure.  
  This is an area where case studies may be useful. Donors were certainly involved in 
internationally-supervised elections in formerly war-torn societies like Liberia and Democratic 
Republic of the Congo. Donors also applied pressure to Kenya to conform to democratic 
principles after the long-time autocrat Daniel Arap Moi left office, and again in 2007-2008 when 
there was a seriously flawed election. However, other flawed elections happened with little donor 
complaint (such as Nigeria in 2007), or there were forceful complaints by donors that were 
ineffective (Zimbabwe 2008). Conversely, some democratic transitions in Africa were based on   91
indigenous mass movements that forced autocrats to hold fair elections, with little donor 
involvement, such as Zambia (Ottaway 2000).   
Figure 14: Recent democracy trends in Africa relative to other countries 


















































































Case studies can also assess some of the tools donors have used to try to promote 
democracy. A widespread aid fashion in the 1990s was for donors to try to strengthen “civil 
society,” voluntary citizens’ associations which were thought to be a way to promote political 
participation and holding governments accountable. Unfortunately, it was very unclear what 
qualified as civil society, or whether all civil society was such a good thing, since voluntary 
membership groups in society could include anything from gangs to the Mafia to terrorist 
organizations (Carothers 2004). In Africa, the uncomfortable reality was that many voluntary 
groups formed along ethnic lines, which politicians often exploited at election time in a way that 
increased ethnic animosity. Even aside from the ethnic issue, other voluntary groups in Africa 
were economic self-help organizations that were relatively apolitical. Donors attempts to fund   92
Western-style NGOs that promoted political participation and issue lobbying often created 
artificial NGOs with few roots in the community, which would immediately collapse if donor 
support was withdrawn (Ottaway 2000). We see again the theme of the good intentions of donors’ 
top-down “transformational” schemes being frustrated by messy bottom-up realities. 
  Olken 2008 uses the randomization methodology to assess the impact of introducing 
more democracy into the aid process itself. A random sample of Indonesian villages was given 
the right to democratically choose which aid projects would be implemented. Aid democracy did 
not have much effect on which projects were actually chosen, but it did dramatically improve 
villagers’ satisfaction with the projects and their willingness to contribute. Again, a micro study 
points to a small step whereby donors could directly introduce a modest level of democracy and it 
would have some effect on outcomes. It is pure guesswork to assess how such steps affect the 
larger agenda of making a country more democratic, but at least it makes a village a little more 
democratic! Again marginal steps towards more democracy seem more feasible (and testable) 
than grandiose democratic ambitions. 
ii.  Empirical evidence on aid and democracy 
A small cross-country regression literature has analyzed the effect of aid on democracy. Knack 
2004 finds no association between aid and the change in democracy from 1975 to 2000, including 
when he instruments for aid. Djankov, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008, 2006) found a causal 
negative relationship from aid to the change in democracy, using the usual suspects as 
instruments for aid.  They labeled this the “aid curse,” in which aid is as bad for democracy as oil 
is in the well-known “oil curse.” The intuition is similar: more money available to those who 
control the state will make them less likely to permit any democratic threat to their stay in power. 
Moss et al. 2008 provide further intuition for such results when they argue that states beholden to 
donors for most of their revenues have less incentive to be accountable to their own citizens 
compared to states dependent on domestic tax revenue. Their argument is most relevant for 
Africa, since the median African country got aid equal to 37 percent of government expenditures   93
over 1990-2006 (compared to 4 percent for non-African aid recipients). They also argue that 
goods provided by donors such as four-wheel drive vehicles or “sitting fees” for attending donor 
seminars (which can exceed monthly salaries of civil servants) can become objects of political 
patronage, reinforcing the “patrimonial state” and further undermining the prospects for 
democracy. Although the catch-all nature of aggregate data sheds little light on how to make aid 
more consistent with promoting democracy, and identification is still problematic, these results 
did reinforce the picture from case studies and aggregate trends that the attempt of aid to 
transform African governments into democratic ones was not a success. 
c.  Property rights: land titling 
The third institutional area suggested by research and that has attracted much interest 
from donors is property rights. In Africa’s agricultural economies, the main asset is land, so there 
has been much focus on reforming land titling so as to implement individual property rights in 
land. De Soto (2000) made an influential statement about the potentially large payoffs from 
converting land with insecure rights (“dead capital” in De Soto’s language) into formal title. This 
has not only the obvious benefit of improving incentives for farmers to invest in land quality 
(recall that crop yields and soil quality are comparatively poor in Africa, as discussed in the 
agriculture section above), but also unlocking access to formal credit using titled land as 
collateral.  The simplest view of how aid donors could improve property rights in land would be 
to give money and advice to implement an effective system of formal paper titles for land, which 
seems akin to the “transformational” view of what outsiders can accomplish. 
The theme of land titles improving incentives is an old one in Africa, as apparent from 
the 1938 statement cited in Table 5 (Lord Hailey 1938, pp. 868, 876): “legal security … can 
most effectively be guaranteed by registration.”. The World Bank (2003b) expressed pretty 
much the same viewpoint, as if very little had changed in 65 years: 
{Land} arrangements found in many countries are often not optimal from either an 
economic or a social perspective. For example, in Africa, the vast majority of the land   94
area is operated under customary tenure arrangements that, until very recently, were not 
even recognized by the state and therefore remained outside the realm of the law. (p. 
xviii) 
 
Despite decades of attempts to register land titles, during both the colonial and 
independence eras, today only about 1 percent of land in Africa is registered under the formal 
system (Blair Commission for Africa 2005, p. 231). In Africa, there has been a long historical 
evolution of customary rights to land. As Pande and Udry 2005 say in a study of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, and Ghana, such rights can be complex: 
what matters for rural land rights is the country's community-based mechanisms as exemplified 
by customary law. The use of almost all land in these four countries is governed by customary 
tenure arrangements, not formal sector rules….The same piece of land can be subject to multiple 
claims which relate to the ways in which it is used by separate groups and individuals at different 
levels. For example, one individual may have the right to cultivate annual crops on a plot, while 
another retains rights to the tree crops that exist on the same land. An elder might have the right 
to allocate a plot to a family member for temporary use, but not the right to rent the plot to an 
outsider on a commercial basis. 
 
Outside donors paid little heed to the pre-existing local arrangements. Under these 
circumstances, issuing a land title to yet another party can increase rather than decrease 
uncertainty about who has what rights to the land.  
Indeed, a number of empirical studies show little effect of outsider-directed formal land 
titles on the incentive to invest in Africa. Jacoby and Minten 2007 found no effect of land titles 
on plot-specific investment in rice fields in Madagascar. Deininger and Jin 2006 have recently 
summarized the literature on land titles in Africa as showing little or no effect of titles on 
investment or access to credit, although they found evidence that a more general measure of 
“tenure security” in Ethiopia (not dependent on titles, which did not exist) fostered land 
investments.
45  
                                                 
45 Earlier studies throughout Africa bear out the picture of ineffective land titling. Migot-Adholla and Place 
(1998), which showed a weak effect of land titles in Kenya on perceived land rights of farmers, credit use, 
and land yields (a measure of investment in the land). A study of land titles in Burkina Faso (Brasselle, 
Gaspart, and Platteau 2002) found no effect of land titles on incentives to invest in the land. Firmin-Sellers 
and Sellers (1999) found that a land titling program in Cameroon was not successful in consolidating 
individual property rights, although it had some other benefits.   95
Why was the payoff to formal land titling in Africa so hard to find? Migot-Adholla et al. 
1991 long ago presented evidence that indigenous property systems in Africa, far from being 
static, have themselves spontaneously evolved towards more individualized land rights in 
response to increased population pressure. They argued therefore that the indigenous systems do 
not constrain investments in increased land productivity. Platteau 1996 also argued that there is 
little evidence of any benefit of formal land rights compared to indigenous systems. Cotula 2007 
and Boudreaux and Aligica 2007 provide more recent statements of this same view, albeit with 
some variations and cautionary notes that indigenous evolution of land rights is not a panacea for 
optimal outcomes. Udry and Pande 2007 have a more recent empirical result reinforcing the 
picture of population pressure-induced evolution of customary land systems; they found that 
commercial land transactions were more likely in matrilineages in Ghana that had higher 
population pressure. 
RE studies from other contexts give a somewhat more positive picture for the effect of 
formal titling. Erica Field has performed a number of studies based on a natural experiment of the 
semi-randomized timing of a government program giving formal titles to urban squatters in Peru. 
Field 2005 found that these titles increased title-owners investment in their urban shantytown 
dwellings (a 68 percent increase in the rate of home renovation in the four years after receiving a 
title). Field 2007 also found that title holders were able to reallocate work away from that 
performed at home and to increase total work hours, plausibly because greater tenure security 
reduced the need to have someone always at home to protect the property. 
 Field and Torero 2006 have a more ambiguous result on the De Soto prediction that 
formal titles would unlock access to credit. They found newly entitled households got more credit 
from government banks, but not from private banks. If the household did manage to get a loan, 
the interest rate for households with titles was 9 percentage points lower. Dower and Potamites 
2007 find that an Indonesian titling program had a positive effect on credit access, but not 
necessarily through collateral for the loans (which is how De Soto thought titles would increase   96
credit access). Their data on rural Indonesian households showed when a title was used as 
collateral, compared to having a title but not using it as collateral on a loan. The latter had an 
effect on access to credit, but the first did not. Their interpretation was that title was more useful 
as a signal of creditworthiness to banks, not through collateral. Sixty percent of titled households 
with formal loans do not use the title as collateral. Further evidence against the “title as 
collateral” story was that the banks also accepted non-formal claims to land as collateral (and 
they accounted for 58 percent of the land collateral cases).  
Udry and Pande 2007’s world wide survey of the land titling literature concludes “Land 
titling and registration typically increase agricultural productivity and farm investment,” but their 
list of studies in Africa mirror the same non-results described above.  
These rather ambiguous results and the clearly different contexts of the Peru and 
Indonesia and other non-Africa studies do little to restore faith in the utility of formal titles in 
Africa. Yet despite all the research and experience in Africa, the aid donors today remain stuck on 
a transformational government reform of land rights in Africa. The United Nations Millennium 
Project 2005 said for example:  “The rule of law involves security in private property and tenure 
rights … upholding the rule of law requires institutions for government accountability… this 
requires a well functioning and adequately paid civil service and judiciary, proper information 
technology (for registration of property …)” (pp. 31, 111)  
This is another apparent failure of the “transformational” approach by donors, and a key 
example of how outsiders exaggerated their own importance. Perhaps further research can find a 
way to gradually build formal institutions on top of indigenous institutions in a way that preserves 
their benefits while adding some advantages of formality. 
D.  Civil war and failed states 
Some African states collapsed altogether over the last 2 decades, and the societies 
descended into civil war, regional warlords, and the nearly complete breakdown of public 
services (e.g. Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of the Congo). Other societies   97
experienced bursts of violence against civilians or outright genocide (e.g. Rwanda in 1994, Darfur 
in the new millennium). Preventing or resolving civil wars, and halting attacks on civilians and 
genocide understandably became part of international aid advocacy on Africa in the new 
millennium. Rich country governments and international organizations responded with plans to 
combine outside military intervention and traditional aid work to take on tasks like ex-ante 
prevention of civil war and genocide or ex-post “fixing failed states” or “post-conflict 
reconstruction.”  
The British aid arm, the Department for International Development (DFID 2006), said that 
“the growing awareness of the linkages between conflict prevention and poverty reduction … and 
the importance attached to helping rebuild countries emerging from conflict all serve to 
emphasise the need for DFID to work effectively with the military.” 
Here once again, we see the theme of escalation, since now the list of aid tools has grown 
to include Western or UN armies and the task list now includes “reconstructing” a war-torn 
society practically from scratch, which is far beyond what the aid industry would have previously 
contemplated. I briefly survey this area mainly to examine whether here we have reached the 
ultimate reductio al absurdum of the West’s transformational approach.   
The World Bank’s economists suggested in a prominent 2003 report called “Breaking the 
Conflict Trap” how “international action” including military intervention and foreign aid could 
achieve both peace and economic development: 
Our new understanding of the causes and consequences of civil wars provides a compelling basis for 
international action. …Increased {foreign} aid and changes in allocation and administration could make 
such assistance more effective in preventing conflict… International action … could avert untold suffering, 
spur poverty reduction, and help to protect people around the world from … drug-trafficking, disease, and 
terrorism. 
The report estimates that a specific package of international military peacekeeping forces, 
reforms, and foreign aid halves the probability of a civil war breaking out in a poor country from 
44 percent to 22 percent.
46 A large-scale World Bank research project lay behind the 2003 report, 
                                                 
46World Bank (2003c), p. 168   98
and continued afterward. The research made valuable contributions in bringing to economists’ 
attention the possible economic dimensions of civil war, but also represented an escalation of 
ambition.  
In his book for general audiences summarizing this research, Collier 2007 gives precise 
recommendations for donor agencies (as well as military agencies): 
So what seems to show up is a sequence. Aid is not very effective in inducing a turnaround in a failing 
state; you have to wait for a political opportunity. When it arises, pour in the technical assistance as 
quickly as possible to help implement reform. Then, after a few years, start pouring in the money for 
the government to spend.”( p. 116) 
I want to persuade you that external military intervention has an important place in helping societies of 
the bottom billion, and that these countries’ own military forces are more often part of the problem 
than a substitute for external military forces. (p. 124) 
Coups such as the one that destabilized Cote d’Ivoire are still a problem for the bottom billion. 
Remember, they are driven by much the same factors as rebellions are: poverty and stagnation. And 
yet it would be relatively easy to make coups history. We just need a credible military guarantee of 
external intervention.  (p. 131) 
Security in postconflict societies will normally require an external military presence, both sending and 
recipient governments should expect this presence to last for around a decade, and must commit to it. 
Much less than a decade and domestic politicians are likely to play a waiting game rather than building 
the peace… Much more than a decade and citizens are likely to get restive for foreign troops to leave 
the country. (p. 177) 
 
Where does this precision come from? A look at the underlying papers listed by Collier 
(2007) – the same ones that emanated from the World Bank project -- shows that they are based 
on cross-country regressions, where the list of variables to be explained now includes civil war 
onset, peace onset, civil war duration, economic growth, military spending, and commodity 
export dependence, and the right hand side variables often include some of the other LHS 
variables on the RHS side of any equation not explaining that particular LHS variables, plus other 
endogenous variables such as aid, UN peacekeeping expenditures, and timing of elections (see 
paper citations below). Unfortunately, even though the list of endogenous variables is even longer 
and more ambitious than in other cross-country literatures, there is either no attempt or a seriously 
inadequate attempt to find instruments or establish causal effects. Endogenous variables swap 
places between LHS and RHS in different articles or different parts of the same article. The 
Deaton et al. (2006) report on the World Bank’s research efforts severely criticized the civil war   99
research on these grounds (while praising the research for raising interesting issues). Daron 
Acemoglu (2006) contributed these comments to the Deaton report: 
The econometric framework is very deficient. It has a number of serious conceptual and 
methodological problems. First of all, at the end the regression is one of endogenous variables on 
endogenous variables. But all of the results are interpreted as causal effects… Contrary to the 
claims in the paper, the regression evidence does not test any well-specified hypothesis, and the 
correlations that are interpreted as causal effects are really no more than correlations…. It is too 
early to jump to policy conclusions. 
47
 
When the World Bank project authors do recognize causality problems, they usually address it by 
lagging the endogenous RHS variable in a panel regression. The reasons why this is inadequate 
are well known – the dubious exclusion restriction, serial correlation, permanent country factors, 
and so on. Some starkly endogenous variables such as UN peacekeeping expenditures are simply 
used without instruments, although the endogeneity problem is acknowledged.  In fairness to the 
authors, it would be difficult to imagine a successful identification strategy for some of the big 
aid policy questions involved in civil war and state failure in Africa.  
One does not have to start out with the presumption of a “transformational” aid policy 
agenda on civil war to determine the research questions, however. For example, Miguel, 
Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004 showed in a widely-cited paper that negative growth shocks cause 
increased likelihood of civil war, using rainfall shocks as a clever instrument for growth shocks 
(although as usual the excludability assumption, that rainfall does not directly affect war, is a 
little problematic). This is very useful to know, even it does not lead to any obvious aid policy 
(aid agencies presumably already wanted to prevent negative growth shocks before this finding, 
and aid agencies have even less effect on rainfall than they do on other variables). For the effects 
going from war to development, Miguel and Roland 2006 examined the long-run impact on 
development of intensity of bombing during the Vietnam War across districts in Vietnam, using 
geographic determinants of bombing patterns as an instrument. These studies suggest that it is 
                                                 
47 Acemoglu was commenting upon Collier and Sambanis 2003, a 2 volume publication that contained the 
above-mentioned findings.   100
possible to address causality between such aggregates as output and war in a more rigorous way 
than was done in the World Bank project. 
The other defense of aggregate work like the World Bank’s could be that, even if they 
cannot be used to justify confident policy interventions, correlations can be a useful guide to 
thinking: it does force one to think about which direction of causality is more likely to explain a 
given correlation, or if there is a third factor that makes two variables move together, which 
points toward some theories and rules out others.  
  However, even establishing partial correlations is not so easy in multivariate analysis. 
The data mining problem seems even worse with civil war and state failure regressions than in 
growth regressions, since there is not enough political economy theory available to guide the 
specification of control variables (and existing theory is little utilized in any case). Indeed, 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderblom 2004 seem to embrace data mining as a methodology:  
Table 3 presents our preferred `baseline’ model of conflict duration, reached after a series 
of iterations in which insignificant variables are deleted and variants of the economic, 
social, geographic and historical explanatory variables are then tested in turn. 
 
As usual, data mining will show up as a failure to pass robustness tests. Take the civil 
war literature’s most famous conclusion: that “greed” trumps “grievance”, because of a 
correlation between dependence on primary commodity revenues and likelihood of civil war 
(interpreted as commodity revenue motivating rebels to try to capture the loot). This had a major 
effect on aid policy, such as the international attempt to regulate trade in “conflict diamonds.” 
Fearon 2005 found that this partial correlation was not robust to very small and plausible changes 
in specification. Hegre and Sambanis 2006 performed a sensitivity analysis of civil war 
regressions similar to Sala-i-Martin’s (1997) Bayesian model averaging exercise for growth 
regressions. They found only a few civil war correlates to be robust, and primary commodity 
dependence was not among them. 
There are other areas where it is not clear what research forms the basis of policy 
recommendations. Collier 2007 also passes judgment on the likely military success of foreign   101
intervention in African civil wars (and thus recommends such intervention as quoted above). He 
points to the ease with which British military intervention halted Sierra Leone’s civil war as “the 
future of military intervention,” dismissing counter-examples such as Somalia or Iraq, and argues 
that a modest military intervention could have prevented the Rwanda genocide (a common view, 
but not without strongly contrarian views like Kuperman (2001)). The real question is on what 
basis do economists make judgments on such strictly military topics as ease of pacification or 
stopping genocide?
48  
Intervention to rescue civilians from war and genocide is certainly appealing. But to the 
extent that economics has anything to say on such an issue, it would seem the current aid policy 
literature on military intervention overlooks basic incentive problems, even more egregiously 
than in other parts of the aid literature.  The hope of international intervention may embolden 
rebels to undertake military action that will inevitably catch many civilians in the cross-fire 
between the rebels and the government before the interveners arrive (Kuperman (2005) and 
Crawford and Kuperman (2008)). To make things worse, the government in turn has the incentive 
to speed up atrocities to achieve its goals before the interveners can come (which is always with a 
lag because of political inertia and the constraints of military logistics).  Exactly this scenario 
played out with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), who said in interviews with Kuperman that 
their violence against Serbs starting in 1997 was motivated by hopes of foreign intervention. The 
Serbian government responded to the NATO bombing campaign in 1999 with massive 
deportations, killings, and rapes of Kosovars, before finally withdrawing from Kosovo under the 
threat of a NATO ground invasion (Rieff 2002). In general, University of Chicago Law Professor 
Eric Posner (2006) points out that a smart tyrant or warlord can foil a humanitarian invasion by 
using civilians as human shields, forcing the invaders to kill those they are trying to save (as 
arguably occurred in Somalia). There is a generic moral hazard problem, which is very relevant in 
                                                 
48 This section places more emphasis on the research by Collier and co-authors than by other authors only 
because the former have been far more influential in aid policy discussions. For a more general scholarly 
review of the civil war literature, see Blattman and Miguel (2008).   102
Africa -- if outside mediators and peacekeeping forces are expected to buy off the most powerful 
warlords to achieve peace, this creates an ex-ante incentive to use violence to become a powerful 
warlord  (and to accelerate violence when intervention is anticipated).  
These examples are meant only to suggest there has not been enough attention to likely 
strategies of the players in humanitarian military interventions. It’s rather embarrassing that key 
theoretical insights such as moral hazard and the complexities of game-theoretic behavior were 
apparently understood more by non-economists than by the economists influencing aid policy in 
this area.  
The related area where policy seems to be running ahead of research is in “re-building 
failed states” (most “failed states” are in Africa). Western concern about “failed states” surged 
because of the example of Afghanistan providing a haven for the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and aid 
agencies have responded accordingly. Aid agencies did reports on this (DFID 2005, World Bank 
2002, USAID 2005), and are mounting major efforts for these “failed states” (which are also 
known in aid jargon as “low income countries under stress (LICUS),” “fragile states,” and “post-
conflict societies”). There has also been a slew of books and reports on “failed states” from 
Washington think tanks and in international relations magazines like Foreign Policy and Foreign 
Affairs, too numerous to be listed here. However, I have not been able to find much in the way of 
academic research on how or whether aid agencies can move a state out of “failure.” Part of the 
difficulty for doing any research seems to be the vagueness of defining which states “failed,” 
when they did so, and if and when they “un-failed”. Although there are a small number of cases 
where everyone agrees there has been state failure (Somalia), aid agencies have typically applied 
“rebuilding failed states” policy to a much larger group.
49  For this larger group, aid agencies 
employ a fuzzy set of criteria for defining state failures, including the last 3 years per capita 
                                                 
49 There is also little discussion of what role aid played in the original “state failure”. Somalia was one of 
the largest recipients of aid per capita in Africa prior to the fall of Siad Barre in 1991 (de Waal 1997). 
Easterly 2006 points out there is a correlation between number of IMF programs and subsequent state 
failure (according to the more restrictive definitions), although interpreting this correlation is obviously 
tricky.   103
growth (USAID 2005, p. 20) to the state’s “ability to protect and support the ways in which the 
poorest people sustain themselves” (DFID 2005, p. 7) to “an unfriendly environment for private 
sector activity” (World Bank 2002, p.4). Since all of these variables have long been studied in 
their own right in development economics, it is not clear to what extent “state failure” is just 
“very low development” by another name. Such fuzziness makes the “state failure” phenomenon 
even more difficult to research. 
   There are only the beginnings of serious research and or even common-sense economic 
thinking in the “state failure” area. Coyne (2008) is a rare but refreshing example of analyzing 
nation-building with an economist’s toolkit. He is very pessimistic about nation-building cum 
military intervention from the standpoint of both the economics of institutions and political 
economy. On the first, formal institutions must be supported by informal social norms and 
individual values (see discussion above), and where these are not present (surely the most likely 
scenario in a “failed state”) a top down military intervention to impose an institution (like 
democracy) is unlikely to succeed. On the second, both the external actors and internal actors 
have their own political incentives and interest groups to satisfy and whether these align with the 
goals of nation-building is anyone’s guess.  For example, foreign military nation-builders often 
have a strong incentive to minimize their own casualties but this tends to increase local casualties, 
which may increase violent resistance to outside nation-builders. For example, Coyne’s case 
study of Somalia shows the repeated attempts by the UN, the US Army, and most recently the 
Ethiopians to create an internationally recognized formal state seem to have increased rather than 
reduced violence. Coyne argues that this happens both because the outside “peacekeepers” are 
seen as an enemy by some factions, and possibly because the prospect of payoffs emanating from 
an aid-receiving formal state increases violent competition by factions to capture this state 
(Coyne 2008). In contrast, regions in Somalia where there has been no foreign intervention have 
been more successful at building their own indigenous state, such as Somaliland and Puntland. 
Weinstein (2005) similarly questions both the assumption that outside intervention is helpful in   104
rebuilding failed states and also questions the fundamental assumption that “failed states” cannot 
recover on their own (giving examples of “autonomous recovery” like Uganda, Eritrea, and 
Somaliland).  
These snippets of analysis are meant to be illustrative rather than a complete treatment of 
an enormously complex issue, in order to make two points. First, in contrast to rare examples 
such as Coyne and Weinstein, it is remarkable that the aid agencies have gone into the nation-
building business without using the most elementary economic and political economy analysis. 
Second, the hubris of the outsiders that they can cleanly resolve complex internal conflicts and fix 
failed states is perhaps the single strongest example of the over-reaching and escalation of the 
donors’ transformational approach in Africa. 
One might think that a marginal approach is not even possible with civil war and post-
conflict questions, but some good recent research suggests otherwise. I give three examples of 
useful empirical research that makes much more progress than aggregate studies on identification. 
Blattman and Annan (2007) tested the effect of soldiering on children in Uganda using the quasi-
randomized variation across children induced by kidnappings of children into the Lord’s 
Resistance Army. One could use such research to ask what aid programs might help rehabilitate 
former child soldiers.  Bellows and Miguel (2008) found a positive effect of wartime 
victimization on subsequent political participation in Sierra Leone, an unexpectedly hopeful result 
for post-conflict recovery.  Paluck (2007) found that a radio program promoting tolerance in post-
conflict Rwanda had some effect on perceived social norms about behaviors affecting ethnic 
conflict, compared to a randomly selected group listening to a radio program with no content on 
post-conflict issues. Although each study of this kind addresses only a narrow issue, a large 
collection of such studies could be useful to guide aid donors in taking many useful “marginal” 
steps to facilitate recovery from civil war and state failure. 
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III.  Conclusions 
 
There are several themes that emerge from this survey of Western efforts to “save Africa.” 
There is little evidence of learning over time within the aid to Africa effort. Instead, within each 
area of effort, there has been a cycling of aid ideas, with a particular approach going out of 
fashion to be replaced by a new fashion, only to have the old fashion come back and once again 
replace the new fashion. The paper argues that this reflects the difficulty of learning when 
pursuing transformational programs. 
  The surge of literature using the RE methodology has arguably been a step forward in 
several important ways: taking identification more seriously, stressing the importance of 
evidence, and above all focusing on taking one step at a time and checking to see if that works 
(the “marginal” approach personified). Unfortunately, this literature now seems more like a 
flawed beginning to a constructive marginal approach than a satisfying end. The RE studies have 
suffered from over-promising and dogmatism from their proponents, heroic extrapolation from 
results in small samples in particular contexts to general conclusions, and lack of a link to 
behavioral models. A more constructive approach might target REs more to shed light on 
behavioral parameters, perhaps use them more to hold aid accountable for results, and to be more 
open to using diverse types of evidence from case studies, other micro empirical research, and 
micro and macro stylized facts and some of the more well-executed macro regressions (with 
appropriate cautions on the severe limitations of the latter). 
The conflict will likely continue between the “marginal” and the “transformational” 
approaches to the overall enterprise of African development. Occasional swings to the more 
modest “marginal” approach seem to quickly result in a countervailing swing to the more 
ambitious “transformational” approach, which has particularly dominated the aid policymaking 
community in aid in recent years. I have argued at the same time that it is difficult to resolve 
conclusively what the effects of the more ambitious programs are and that the better attempts at 
doing so give multiple signs of failure of these programs.     106
Although the evidence has not been (and perhaps can never be) completely definitive on 
transformational approaches, there has in practice been widespread disappointment with each 
successive transformational approach. The current state of knowledge thus argues even more for 
caution in applying large scale outside interventions that could have unintended negative effects. 
Unfortunately, far from retreating from the transformational approach, each successive 
disappointment has led to an escalation of outside intervention, from the project approach to 
improve sectoral outcomes, to Filling the Financing Gap with aid, to structural adjustment 
conditions on economic policies, to attempts to modify institutions such as corruption, 
democracy, and property rights, and finally, most ambitiously to prevent civil war and reconstruct 
failed states, including outside military intervention. 
The dangers of the transformational approach, such as the one that wishes to “save Africa”, 
are captured well by a famous quote from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments: 
The man of system, on the contrary, is apt to be very wise in his own conceit; and is often so 
enamoured with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer 
the smallest deviation from any part of it. He goes on to establish it completely and in all its parts, 
without any regard either to the great interests, or to the strong prejudices which may oppose it. 
He seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much 
ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-board. He does not consider that the 
pieces upon the chess-board have no other principle of motion besides that which the hand 
impresses upon them; but that, in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a 
principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might chuse to 
impress upon it. If those two principles coincide and act in the same direction, the game of human 
society will go on easily and harmoniously, and is very likely to be happy and successful. If they 
are opposite or different, the game will go on miserably, and the society must be at all times in 
the highest degree of disorder. 
 
“The game going on miserably” with the “highest degree of disorder” may be an apt description 
of the current disarray in aid to Africa.  One can only hope that the record of the past will chasten 
outsiders to be more modest and humble about what they can do for Africa. Far from a counsel of 
despair, such a correction of expectations may make possible a sizeable expansion of programs 
that deliver substantial benefits to poor Africans under the “marginal” approach.   
As far as the “transformational” approach, its ambitions are certainly understandable 
given the realities of poverty and suffering in Africa. But these understandable ambitions seem to   107
have created an intellectual bias that exaggerates the importance and potential for benevolent 
action of outside actors, as well as exaggerating Africa’s negatives and inability to fix itself.  
Even if the evidence fails to support the hypothesis that outside aid can create economic 
development, it does not follow that development is a hopeless cause. On the contrary, 
developing countries worldwide have grown at about 2 percent per capita since 1960, almost 
tripling per capita income. It is too soon to tell whether Africa’s respectable growth since the 
mid-1990s means that it is joining the worldwide growth club, but there is no reason to think that 
it will be forever excluded.  
As far as the role of outsiders in such growth, it is suggestive that most sustained and 
largest surges in GDP per capita (notably Botswana and Mauritius in Africa, as well as the East 
Asian tigers elsewhere, and more recently, India and China) have been largely homegrown rather 
than the result of ambitious outside aid and intervention.
50 It would be worth testing and 
exploring more the hypothesis that most successful development is homegrown. And if so, 
research should concentrate more on homegrown determinants of development rather than spend 
so much time on outsiders’ actions. Perhaps then we might find that the ones most likely to “save 




                                                 
50 See discussion in Easterly (2006).   108
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